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THE WAYNE LAW REVIEW 
VOLUME 32 SUMMER 1986 NUMBER 4 
TOWARD A JURISPRUDENCE OF 
BANK-CUSTOMER RELATIONS 
PETER A. ALCESt 
I. INTRODUCTION 
This is an Article about contradictions. First, there is the 
oxymoron suggested by the title: we are not used to so flagrant 
a juxtaposition of the theoretical, "jurisprudence," with the prac-
tical, the interstices of the bank-customer relationship. Second, 
contemporary payments law presents contradictory, often confus-
ing, legislative predispositions. Articles 31 and 42 of the Uniform 
Commercial Code (UCC), which govern the negotiation, payment, 
and collection of checks,3 are particularly indulgent of the rights 
t Associate Professor, University of Alabama School of Law. A.B. 1977, 
Lafayette College; J.D. 1980, University of Illinois. A substantial portion of this 
Article was written while the author was a Visiting Assistant Professor at the 
University of Texas School of Law, during the Summer of 1985. I am grateful 
to Professors Douglas Laycock, Elizabeth Warren, and Jay L. Westbrook for 
their helpful comments on early drafts of the manuscript, but it would be 
inappropriate to burden them with blame for any inadequacies of the finished 
product. I am not, however, reluctant to share the blame (and even some of the 
glory) with my research assistants, Robert G. Boliek, Jr., Virginia Patterson, 
Vanessa Stoner, and Maeveen Behan. 
1. Although there is no specific "scope" provision in Article 3, § 3-101 of 
the Uniform Commerical Code (U.C.C.) sets forth the short title of the Article: 
"This Article shall be known and may be cited as Uniform Commercial Code-
Commercial Paper." U.C.C. § 3-101 (1977). Limitations to the scope of the 
Article are provided in § 3-103. Money, documents of title, and investment 
securities are specifically excluded, and the Article is explicitly made subject to 
the provisions of Articles 4 and 9. See id. § 3-103. 
2. There is no specific "scope" section to Article 4. However, § 4-101 
sets forth the short title of the Article: "This Article shall be known and may 
be cited as Uniform Commercial Code-Bank Deposits and Collections." !d. § 
4-101. Moreover, in the case of conflict between the provisions of Articles 3 and 
4, the Article 4 provisions will govern. See id. §§ 3-103(2), 4-102(1) & comment 
1. 
3. Checks, as traditionally processed, clearly fit within the Article 4 
definition of "items": negotiable and nonnegotiable paper calling for the payment 
of money. See id. § 4-104(1)(g) & comment 4. The increasing use of electronic 
transfer messages in the check collection system has lead to questions regarding 
the continued application of Article 4 to modem bank collection practice. "The 
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of financial institutions. 4 Conversely, the law governing electronic 
fund transfers5 and credit cards6 is clearly a product of the consumer 
conclusion that Article 4 is inapplicable to evolving payment systems is based 
primarily on the view that a stored electronic payment message does not fit the 
UCC definition of an 'item' .... " Alces, A Jurisprudential Perspective for the 
True Codification of Payments Law, 53 FoRDHAM L. REv. 83, 85 n.7 (1984) 
(citing Evra Corp. v. Swiss Bank Corp., 673 F.2d 951, 955 (7th Cir.), cert. 
denied, 459 U.S. 1017 (1982); Delbrueck & Co. v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust 
Co., 609 F.2d 1047, 1051 (2d Cir. 1979); Jetton, Evra Corp. v. Swiss Bank 
Corp.: Consequential Damages for Bank Negligence in Wire Transfers, 9 RuTGERS 
CoMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 369, 398 & n.127 (1983)). For further discussion of the 
potential obsolescence of Articles 3 and 4, see Dunne, The Checkless Society 
and Articles 3 and 4, 24 Bus. LAw. 127, 127-28 (1968); Penney, Articles 4 and 
8 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 26 LA. L. REv. 259, 264 (1966); Penney, 
Bank Statements, Cancelled Checks, and Article Four in the Electronic Age, 65 
MICH. L. REv. 1341, 1357-60 (1967). See generally Dunne, Variation on a Theme 
by Parkinson or Some Proposals for the Uniform Commercial Code and the 
Checkless Society, 15 YALE L.J. 788 (1966) (system of check use is inefficient). 
But see Clarke, An Item is an Item is an Item: Article 4 of the U.C.C. and the 
Electronic Age, 25 Bus. LAW. 109 (1969) (Article 4 can accommodate the issues 
presented by new payment systems). 
4. Many commentators have noted the bias of Article 4 towards the 
rights of financial institutions. See, e.g. , Beutel, The Proposed Uniform [?] 
Commercial Code Should Not Be Adopted, 61 YALE L.J. 334, 357-63 (1952); 
Gilmore, The Uniform Commercial Code: A Reply to Professor Beutel, 61 YALE 
L.J. 364, 374-79 (1952); Leary & Schmitt, Some Bad News and Some Good 
News from Articles Three and Four, 43 OHio ST. L.J. 611, 613-15 (1982); 
McDonnell, Bank Liability for Fraudulent Checks: The Clash of the Utilitarian 
and Paternalist Creeds Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 13 GEo. L.J. 1399, 
1409-13 (1985). But cf. Pape, Stop Payment in the Uniform New Payments Code, 
9 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 353, 353 & n.3 (1983) (suggesting that the 
U.C.C., at least in regard to stop payment orders, takes a "balancing" approach 
between the rights of consumers and the rights of banks). 
5. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1693-1693r (1982) (codifying as amended the Elec-
tronic Fund Transfer Act of 1978 (E.F.T.A.)). The purpose of the Act is to 
provide "a basic framework establishing the rights, liabilities, and responsibilities 
of participants in electronic fund transfer systems . . . [and to provide for] 
individual consumer rights." /d. § 1693(b) (emphasis added). For further discussion 
of the E.F.T.A., see Brandel & Olliff, The Electronic Fund Transfer Act: A 
Primer, 40 OHio ST. L.J . 531 (1979); Fox, Another Step Toward the Cashless 
Society? The 1978 Federal Electronic Fund Transfer Act, 18 AM. Bus. L.J. 209 
(1980); Schellie, Electronic Fund Transfer Act, 34 Bus. LAW. 1441 (1979); Taffer, 
The Making of the Electronic Fund Transfer Act: A Look at Consumer Liability 
and Error Resolution, 13 U.S.F.L. REv. 231 (1979). 
6. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. §§ 1666-1666j (1982 & Supp. II 1984) (codifying 
as amended the Fair Credit Billing Act of 1974); 12 C.F.R. §§ 226.1).29 (1986) 
(Regulation Z). Regulation Z establishes liability limits for holders of credit cards, 
id. § 226.12(b)(1), delineates procedures for dealing with credit card disputes, id. 
§ 226.13(c))(d), and describes the information that must be given to customers 
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movement. Why the law supporting different payment modes 
should proceed from two diametrically opposed frames of reference 
is not intuitively obvious. In fact, given the essential similarities 
among the available payment media, such stark opposition is 
counter-intuitive and intimates the operation of forces not im-
mediately apparent. 
Good sense may be made in the course of attempting to 
reconcile those contradictions. There is no alchemy involved in 
expounding a jurisprudence of the relationship between a financial 
institution and its customer. Karl Llewellyn, principal architect of 
the UCC, explained the roles of jurisprudential inquiry by sug-
gesting that investigation of legal matters' may be pursued on three 
levels: jurisprudence for the hundred, for the hundred thousand, 
and for the hundred million. 8 He had no real interest in sustained 
ratiocinations that would only excite the hundred, "the more 
esoteric tradition of the writers about the writers and for the 
writers . . . in the language or in the general tradition of profes-
sional philosophy. " 9 Llewellyn's thesis, as ultimately executed in 
Article 2 of the UCC, required focus on the other two levels, 
jurisprudence for the hundred thousand and for the hundred 
million. "Jurisprudence for the hundred thousand" formulates the 
in their periodic statements, id. § 226.7. See generally Weistart, Consumer 
Protection in the Credit Card Industry: Federal Legislative Controls, 10 MICH. 
L. REv. 1475 (1972) (discussing statutes and regulations governing credit cards); 
Note, Credit Cards: Distributing Fraud Loss, 11 Yale L.J. 1418 (1968) (discussing 
legislation dealing with credit card fraud). The Fair Credit Billing Act establishes 
procedures for the resolution of credit card billing errors. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 
1666-1666j; N. PENNEY & D. BAKER, THE LAW OF ELECTRONIC FUND TRANSFER 
SYSTEMS 1 10.02[21[d], at 1()..32 to -34 (1980). These laws are more solicitous 
of certain consumer rights than is Article 4. See Alces, supra note 3, at 96 (citing 
Nimmer, Consumer Payment Systems: Leverage Effects Within An Electronic 
Funds Transfer System, 17 Hous. L. REv. 487, 507-09 (1980)). 
7. Llewellyn was mindful not to unnecessarily narrow the scope of the 
concept of "law," see Llewellyn, A Realistic Jurisprudence-The Next Step, 30 
CoLUM. L. REv. 431, 432 (1930), specifically stating: "I have no desire to exclude 
anything from matters legal.'' /d. at 432. 
8. See K. Llewellyn, Law in Our Society (1950) (unpublished course 
materials) reprinted in part in W. TWINING, KARL LLEWELLYN AND THE REALIST 
MoVEMENT 499-500 (1973); see also id. at 173 ("Llewellyn distinguished between 
'jurisprudence for the hundred', 'jurisprudence for the hundred thousand', ... 
and 'jurisprudence for the hundred million."'). 
9. K. Llewellyn, supra note 8, at 499; see also W. TWINING, supra note 
8, at 173 ("In a very high proportion of [Llewellyn's] teaching and writing he 
denied, not always convincingly, that he was concerned with 'jurisprudence for 
the hundred' and claimed to be operating at the level of 'jurisprudence for the 
hundred thousand."'). 
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concentration of Llewellyn's writing: "for the Bar in daily living, 
and for the citizen who is willing to take a moment off to 
ponder. . . . 'Almost any rule of law can be put into language an 
ordinary man can understand.' The same is true of problems about 
law. Both jobs badly need doing." 10 This Article assumes that 
meaningful examination of commercial issues must proceed from 
the perspective of the hundred thousand; if the UCC fails that 
group, it cannot hope to secure the ''hundred million,'' the citizenry 
at large.'' The bank customer, then, should be able to understand 
what the bank is doing and why, and a sound jurisprudence of 
the bank-customer relationship ought to derive from such a ''re-
alistic" perspective. 
Even those who are able to come to terms with the relationship 
between jurisprudence and commercial transactions will be troubled 
by the second apparent contradiction: the inconsistent treatment 
of similar transactions occasioned by the divergent legislative per-
spectives from which our payments law has developed. The UCC, 
particularly in Article 4, serves the interests of financial institutions. 
Therefore, the consumer who pays by a draft drawn on a bank 
is subject to the institutional bias of uniform state check collection 
law. If that same consumer uses a Visa or Master Card check, 
federal law may12 govern and offer protection mechanisms nowhere 
contemplated by the drafters of the UCC. While the source of 
this contradiction can and will be explained, the disparate treatment 
of largely indistinguishable payments media cannot be rationalized. 
The American Law Instit11te (ALI)13 and the National Conference 
10. K. Llewellyn, supra note 8, at 500. 
11. Llewellyn stated: "Men . . . can understand the guts of Jurisprud-
ence. . . . (The bank clerk and the Negotiable Instruments Law. The warehouse-
man and the Uniform Warehouse Receipts Act. The union and the Wagner 
Act.-The citizen in general?)" /d. 
12. "Visa checks" are one type of modern payment device about which 
current law is uncertain and contradictory. They are furnished to cardholders by 
the issuer or financial institution and they permit the cardholder to write checks 
against his line of credit. Substantial questions have arisen concerning the law 
applicable to this new payment device. See Memorandum from Donald J. Rapson 
to the 1983 Uniform New Payments Code Invitational Conference (Sept. 30, 
1983) (Should "MasterChecking" be treated as a method of payment or an 
extension of credit, a check loan, or a credit card cash advance?) (on file at The 
Wayne Law Review). 
13. The American Law Institute (ALI) had its origins in a committee 
organized in 1921 under the auspices of the Association of American Law Schools. 
This initial committee reported in 1922 and recommended the foundation of a 
permanent body, the ALI. The ALI's first project was to be a Restatement of 
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of Commissioners for Uniform State Laws (N.C.C.U.S.L.)14 joined 
in support of the Uniform New Payments Code (U.N.P.C.)15 
project to develop a comprehensive statute that would treat similar 
media similarly. The deterioration of that project informs the 
analysis developed here.16 
This Article will compare the equities claimed in support of 
both the profmandal and consumer-protectionist payments legis-
lation. First, the check law of the UCC is compared to federal 
electronic fund transfer law by focusing on the liability of financial 
institutions for paying over a valid stop order. Then, the juris-
prudential foundations of the most Llewellynesque portions of the 
vee are explored to formulate the impact of legal realism on 
commercial codification. The substance of Article 2 rules reveals 
the unique perspective of the realistic approach and the development 
of commercial law along lines consistent with tort, rather than 
contract, principles. Finally, this Article will demonstrate that 
thoughtful jurisprudential analysis is a crucial prerequisite to the 
promulgation of coherent commerical law. The Article concludes 
that the application of realistic principles to payments legislation 
best accommodates the interests of banks as well as their customers. 
The use of realistic principles as a foundation for future codification 
efforts can resolve the imbalances prevalent in existing law by 
establishing an intermediate position between the two extremes. 
There is room for true consensus. 
the Law. See W. TWINING, supra note 8, at 273-74. See generally Goodrich, The 
Story of the American Law Institute, 1951 WASH. U.L.Q. 283 (history and 
overview of ALI activities); Lewis, History of the American Law Institute and 
the First Restatement of the Law, in RESTATEMENT IN THE CouRTS 1 (1945) 
(discussing evolution of ALI and Restatement). 
14. The N.C.C.U.S.L. was founded in 1892 and is comprised of unpaid 
commissioners appointed by state governors and responsible for preparing leg-
islation for possible adoption by state legislatures. W. TWINING, supra note 8, 
at 272. See generally Dunham, A History of the National Conference of Com-
missioners on Uniform State Laws, 30 LAW & CoNTE~fP. PROBS. 233 (1965) 
(discussion of unification of law in U.S.). 
15. UNIFORM NEW PAYMENTS CODE (perm. ed. bd. draft no. 3, 1983) 
[hereinafter cited as U.N.P.C.]. The U.N.P.C. was to be preemptive payments 
legislation. Indeed, the U.N.P.C. was drafted to apply to "any orders funds 
[sic] payable by or at, or transmitted by or to, an account institution." /d. § 
2(1) (emphasis added). A covered "aGcount institution" is defined as "any person 
which in the ordinary course of its business maintains accounts for its customers," 
id. § 53(1), and an "order" is broadly defined to include both electronic and 
paper-based transfers, id. § 10 & comment 2 (discussing the purpose and existing 
law). 
16. See Report of the Director, in AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTION, 1985 ANNuAL 
REPORT 15-16. 
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II. CONTEMPORARY PAYMENTS LAW 
Unlike the uniform law of sales, payments law has not devel-
oped systematically along lines established by reference to thought-
ful jurisprudential principles. 17 A comparison of the legislative 
foundations of Article 4 of the UCC and representative branches 
of new payments systems law reveals that the competing legislative 
initiatives do not properly accommodate the opposing interests of 
financial institutions and their customers. During the formative 
years of the check collection system in the United States, the 
American Bankers Association advocated the development of com-
mon law and statutory principles that would insulate banks from 
risk and reinforce the superior bargaining position of its constit-
uency.18 Those efforts at risk avoidance are better viewed as 
commercially shrewd than necessarily evil; the more transaction 
risk banks could avoid and impose on their customers, the more 
profitable the banking business could become. However, it is one 
thing to absolve the bank lobby from moral blame for advocating 
its self-interest, but quite another to abdicate to that interest group 
nearly absolute legislative authority. The history of Article 4 of 
the UCC suggests that bank interests may have been overrepresented 
on the committee responsible for the final draft of the Deposits 
and Collections provisions of the Code. An analysis of the language, 
operation, and legislative history of section 4-407 illustrates the 
predisposition of Article 4. 
A. The Payor Bank,s Right to Subrogation on Improper 
Payment Under Section 4-407 of the UCC 
Although a drawer retains the "absolute" right to stop payment 
on a check any time prior to its payment, 19 section 4-407 of the 
17. For a discussion of the genesis of the U.C.C., especially in regard to 
Article 2 and its predecessors, see W. TWINING, supra note 8, at 270-301. 
18. See Scott, The Risk Fixers, 91 HARV. L. REv. 737, 740-76 (1978). 
"The commercial law of bank collections . . . reflects the desire of transactors 
to alter the competitive effects of the existing allocation of risk. Commercial 
legislation becomes the method by which particular interests achieve their sub-
stantive objectives, instead of a means by which society develops a rational 
payments system." /d. at 792. 
19. See U.C.C. § 4-403 (1977) ("Customer's Right to Stop Payment; 
Burden of Proof of Loss") & comment 2, which states: "The position taken by 
this section is that stopping payment is a service which depositors expect and 
are entitled to receive from banks notwithstanding its difficulty, inconvenience 
and expense.'' 
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UCC20 effectively shifts the risk of a bank's wrongful payment of 
an item in contravention of the stop payment order from the bank 
to the customer. In an action by the drawer against its bank to 
recover the amount wrongfully paid, section 4-407 allows the bank 
to assert the defenses of the payee or any holder of the instrument. 21 
If the check previously had come into the possession of a holder 
in due course, 22 the drawer would have virtually no recourse23 
against the drawee bank. The depositary bank,24 or any intermediary 
bank, 25 including the presenting bank, 26 may qualify for holder in 
due course status as long as it gives "value"27 for the paper. Since 
most checks are presented through banking channels rather than 
"over the counter," and since depositary banks give value when 
they permit a customer to draw against uncollected funds, 28 the 
subrogation rights provided by section 4-407 are substantial. 29 
The average check, according to a 1982 report,30 is drawn for 
$570. This amount may be significant to individual consumers, 
20. /d. § 4-407 ("Payor Bank's Right to Subrogation on Improper Pay-
ment"). 
21. See id. 
22. See id. § 3-302(1) (defining holder in due course status). 
23. See id. § 4-407(a) (establishing the payor bank's right to be subrogated 
to the rights "of any holder in due course on the item against the drawer or 
maker"). 
24. A "depositary bank" is defined as "the first bank to which an item 
is transferred for collection even though it is also the payor bank." /d. § 4-
105(a). 
25. An "intermediary bank" is defined as "any bank to which an item 
is transferred in course of collection except the depositary or payor bank." /d. 
§ 4-105(c). 
26. A "presenting bank" is defined as "any bank presenting an item 
except a payor bank." /d. § 4-105(e). "Presentment" is defined in Article 4, see 
id. § 4-104(3), by reference to § 3-504, which formulates "presentment" as "a 
demand for acceptance or payment made upon the maker, acceptor, drawee, or 
other payor by or on behalf of the holder." /d. § 3-504(1). 
27. See id. § 3-302(1)(a) (requiring that holder in due course take the 
instrument for value). Banks may give "value" and achieve holder in due course 
status under Article 4 by the operation of two sections. One section accords 
banks a security interest in a check or its proceeds in certain circumstances. See 
id. § 4-208{1). The other establishes that, for the purpose of holder in due course 
status, "value" is given on an item in which the bank has a security interest to 
the extent of that security interest. See id. § 4-209; infra notes 217-29 and 
accompanying text. 
28. See U.C.C. §§ 4-208(l)(c), 4-209. 
29. See Sun 'N Sand, Inc. v. United Cal. Bank, 21 Cal. 3d 671, 582 P.2d 
920, 148 Cal. Rptr. 329 (1978). 
30. See ARTHUR D. LITTLE, INC., ISSUES AND NEEDS IN THE NATION'S 
PAYMENT SYSTEM 12, table 1 (1982). 
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but is not likely to justify economically the drawer's initiation and 
prosecution of a lawsuit against the drawee that has paid over a 
stop order. In many instances, the amount of a wrongfully paid 
check might exceed the state's small claims court jurisdictional 
limit and yet be insufficient to justify the litigation expense and 
delays inherent in a standard tort or contract case. Certainly, were 
the litigation postures reversed, it is unlikely that a payor bank 
would initiate an action to recover its wrongful payment of the 
average check. Early drafts of Article 4 did not authorize a drawee 
to unilaterally debit the drawer's account for an item paid over a 
valid stop order.31 In late 1951 however, the portion of draft 
section 4-507 that prohibited a bank from debiting a customer's 
account after wrongfully paying an item was deleted.32 The section 
4-407 subrogation rights thereafter were used defensively by drawee 
banks. 
A relic of the pre-1951 formulation appears in the section 4-
407 language providing that the drawee's rights under the provision 
are only available "to prevent unjust enrichment and only to the 
extent necessary to prevent loss to the bank by reason of its 
payment of the item. " 33 As the subrogation provision now operates, 
the unjust enrichment language is not coextensive with the second 
portion of the same clause preventing loss to the bank by reason 
of its wrongful payment. 34 Section 4-407 permits the bank to recoup 
its loss absolutely, not subject to the unjust enrichment limitation, 
provided the bank can fortuitously identify a prior holder in due 
course. 35 However, when the drawer stops payment for cause and 
31. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 4-507 (Proposed Final Draft No. 2, Spring 1951), 
reprinted in 12 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE: DRAFTS 188 (E. Kelly ed. 1984) 
[hereinafter cited as U.C.C.: DRAFTs]. 
32. See U.C.C. §§ 4-101 to -407 (Final Text Ed. 1951), reprinted in 12 
U.C.C.: DRAFTS, supra note 31, at 536-57. 
33. U.C.C. § 4-407. Similar language appeared in code drafts dating back 
to at least 1950. See U.C.C. § 4-402 (Proposed Final Draft, Spring 1950), 
reprinted in 10 U.C.C.: DRAFTs, supra note 31, at 532-33. 
34. See South Shore Nat'l Bank v. Donner, 104 N.J. Super. 169, 177, 
249 A.2d 25, 30 (1969) ("While the remedy afforded by section 4-407 is in part 
expressly directed to the prevention of 'unjust enrichment,' nowhere in the statute 
is there any requirement that all of the defendants who may be joined in the 
action be 'unjustly enriched.'"). 
35. This perversion of the unjust enrichment doctrine contradicts the 
accepted understanding of the concept. The Restatement of Restitution explains 
that the equitable right tor subrogation arises when the "property of one person 
is used [to discharge] an obligation owed by another . . . under such circumstances 
that the other would be unjustly enriched by the retention of the benefits thus 
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the payor is permitted to assume the rights of a holder in due 
course, unjust enrichment is inapposite. Subsection (c) of 4-407, 
which subrogates the payor to rights of the drawer against the payee, 
should sufficiently protect the payor in this setting.36 The justifi-
cation for the holder in due course concept, if it has any application 
in contemporary payments law, 37 is absent from the section 4-407 
subrogation contest. The original "law merchant" interest in ~ash 
substitutes does not support a rule that sanctions drawee negligence. 
The expediency of the payments system is not improved by com-
mercial paper laws that insulate negligent practices from victims' 
efforts to recoup their losses. Under the current formulation, the 
drawer whose account has been charged over a valid stop payment 
order must initiate legal action to recover the misapplied funds. 
To prevail, the drawer must overcome the drawee's assertion of 
holder in due course rights. Given the relative ease with which 
depositary banks may claim holder in due course status under 
Article 4, 38 the drawer invariably will be unable to overcome that 
assertion. 
Notwithstanding the Code drafters' protestations that the UCC 
was designed to describe and clarify rather than change the com-
mercial practices existing at the time of its composition, 39 Article 
4, particularly in section 4-407, readjusted rights existing prior to 
its promulgation. Pre-UCC law provided that a bank that paid 
over a valid stop payment order would be liable to the drawer for 
conferred." RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF RESTITUTION § 162 (1937). A drawer 
who pays for goods by check and then stops payment without cause is not 
injured when the payee receives payment even if that is only accomplished by 
the bank's payment over the stop order. To avoid unjust enrichment in that 
context, the payor need not assume the rights of a holder in due course because 
§ 4-407 allows the payor to subrogate the rights of the payee. See V.C.C. § 4-
407(b). 
36. See V.C.C. § 4-407(c). 
37. For a cogent critique of the effects of holder in due course status in 
the context of checks, see Rosenthal, Negotiability: Who Needs It? 71 CoLUM. 
L. REv. 375, 381-94 (1971); see also Gilmore, The Good Faith Purchase Idea 
and the Uniform Commercial Code: Confessions of a Repentant Draftsman, 15 
GA. L. REV. 605 (1981) (questioning efficacy of general notion of the "good 
faith purchaser" in modern commercial law). 
38. See supra notes 19-29 and accompanying text. 
39. See, e.g., Gilmore, supra note 4, at 377-78 ("The Code is not of 
course a reform statute; it is not designed to bring the millenium . . • . It is an 
honest effort to state basic rules of commercial law which reflect, more accurately 
and flexibly than do the present rules, going methods of operation."). 
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the amount of the check.40 This provision could lead to harsh 
results. A drawer might stop payment of a check for no legitimate 
reason. Then, if the bank paid over the stop order, the drawer 
could retain any consideration he received from the payee of the 
check and require the drawee to recredit his account. The bank 
would be liable for the amount of the check and the drawer would, 
upon the recredit, be unjustly enriched to the extent that the 
consideration he received from the payee was valuable. That strict 
liability rule was inefficient and unjust. Subrogation theory de-
veloped to mitigate the harshness of that result. 41 A bank that 
negligently paid over a stop order would be strictly liable to the 
drawer subject to the bank's right to subrogation against a party 
unjustly enriched, possibly the drawer. 42 It was suggested that 
application of subrogation principles would solve "the social wel-
fare-maximizing equation.' ' 43 
40. See F. BEUTEL, BRANNON NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW 1316 (7th 
ed. 1948) ("Since a check is not an assignment of the drawer's funds, the bank 
is liable to him for paying it in disregard of a countermand.") (citing Hiroshima 
v. Bank of Italy, 78 Cal. App. 362, 248 P. 947 (1926); First Nat'l Bank of 
Miami v. Davis, 150 Fla. 673, 8 So.2d 403 (1942); Miller v. Chatham & Phoenix 
Nat'l Bank, 126 Misc. 559, 214 N.Y.S. 76 (1926); Wall v. Franklin Trust Co., 
84 Pa. Super. Ct. 392 (1925); Pease & Dwyer Co. v. State Nat'l Bank, 114 Tenn. 
693, 88 S.W. 172 (1905); Huffman v. Farmers' Nat'l Bank, 10 S.W.2d 753 (Tex. 
Civ. App. 1928)). 
41. See Comment, Stop Payment: An Ailing Service to the Business 
Community, 20 U. Cm. L. REv. 667, 673-74 (1953) ("To reduce the sanction 
for failure to [heed a stop-payment order] . •• several theories have been 
advanced •..• The most favored theory is that of subrogation .. . . "). 
42. In this way, subrogation elegantly satisfies the sanction criterion 
... : the real burden that stop payment seeks to minimize-finding, and 
getting and executing judgment against a party wrongfully paid-is clearly 
placed upon the bank, but there is no penalty .. . insofar as the failure 
causes no injury. 
/d. at 674. 
43. /d. Banking interests, however, were not comfortable with this social 
welfare calculus. The bankers were in favor of eliminating the drawer's right to 
stop payment, by relying upon freedom of contract principles. In passbooks and 
stop order forms, the banks included clauses exculpating them from negligently 
paying over a stop order. /d. at 675; see Note, Exculpation Contracts in 
Stop-Payment Orders, 6 RuTGERS L. REv. 577, 579 (1952) ("[B]anks have resorted 
to release clauses to protect themselves against responsibility for failure to obey 
stop-payment orders."); see also Malcolm, Article 4-A Battle With Complexity, 
1952 Wis. L. REv. 265, 266 ("[T]he practice had developed for banks to state 
. . . on deposit tickets, bank statements, collection letters and acknowledgments 
of receipt of items the terms under which they would undertake collection of 
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The subrogation theory appeared in the 1934 draft of a Uniform 
Bank Collection Act prepared by the N.C.C.U.S.L. but was never 
promulgated.44 The theory reappeared in the 1949 draft of Article 
3 in Comment 8 to section 3-415, and precluded banks from 
contractually avoiding their stop payment obligation. 45 Comment 
8, however, gave effect to the subrogation theory stating: 
The drawee is . . . entitled to subrogation to prevent unjust 
enrichment. It has sometimes been said that payment cannot 
be stopped against a holder in due course, but the statement 
is inaccurate. The payment can be stopped, but the drawee, 
if he pays, becomes subrogated to the rights of a holder 
in due course against the drawer. 46 
items."). 
Such clauses were found to be valid in some states. See Comment, supra 
note 41, at 675 (citing Hodrick v. Fidelity Trust Co., 96 Ind. App. 342, 183 
N.E. 488 (1932); Tremont Trust Co. v. Burack, 235 Mass. 398, 126 N.E. 782 
(1920); Gaita v. Windsor Bank, 251 N.Y. 152, 167 N.E. 203 (1929)). Most states, 
however, found that such clauses violated either public policy or the consideration 
rules of contract doctrine and thus invalidated them on one or the other of these 
grounds. See Comment, supra note 41, at 675 (citing Hiroshima v. Bank of 
Italy, 78 Cal. App. 362, 248 P. 947 (1926) (public policy); Grisinger v. Golden 
State Bank, 92 Cal. App. 443, 268 P. 425 (1928) (public policy); Calimita v. 
Tradesmen's Nat'l Bank, 135 Conn. 326, 64 A.2d 46 (1949) (consideration); 
Reinhardt v. Passaic-Clifton Nat'I Bank & Trust Co., 16 N.J. Super. 430, 84 
A.2d 741 (1951), aff'd, 9 N.J. 607, 89 A.2d 242 (1952) (consideration; Speroff 
v. First-Central Trust Co., 149 Ohio St. 415, 79 N.E.2d 119 (1948) (public 
policy); Thomas v. First Nat'l Bank, 126 L.I. 203 (Pa. 1952) (public policy); 
Note, supra at 589-90. 
44. Section 14 of a proposed draft of this Act read as follows: 
A bank of payment which prematurely pays a post-dated item drawn 
on or made or accepted payable at such bank, or which pays an item 
contrary to a duly received stop order, may, at its election, treat the 
item as unpaid and have such rights upon the item against the drawer 
or person making or accepting the item so payable as the holder thereof 
to whom it paid would have in such case, or treat it as paid and have 
such rights growing out of the transaction giving rise to the item as the 
drawer or person making the item so payable would have against the 
person to whom it was issued. 
Unif. Bank Collection Act § 14 (5th Tent. Draft 1934), reprinted in HANDBOOK 
OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS 172-
73 (1934) (emphasis in original), and noted in Comment, supra note 41, at 674 
n.33. 
45. Subsection 3-415(4) of the 1949 draft read as follows: "Although the 
drawee cannot by contract avoid its obligations under this section, it may make 
a reasonable charge for stopping payment." U.C.C. §3-415 (Draft, May 1949), 
reprinted in 7 U.C.C.: DRAFTs, supra note 31, at 384. 
46. U.C.C. § 3-415 comment 8 (Draft, May 1949), reprinted in 7 U.C.C.: 
DRAFTS, supra note 31, at 386. 
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Notwithstanding the questionable logic of providing the drawee 
subrogation to holder in due course rights, 47 the section clearly 
and correctly placed the initial loss on the negligent drawee. A 
bank could not debit the drawer's account but was required to 
incur the expense and uncertainty of a legal proceeding to obtain 
reimbursement for loss attributable to its own negligence.48 
At hearings on the UCC held in January 1951, Article 4 was 
severely criticized by representatives of financial institution inter-
ests. In May 1951, Article 4 was deleted from the Code.49 By 
September of the same year, a draft reworked by bankers and 
their counsel was quickly approved by the ALI and N.C.C.U.S.L.50 
The Bank Deposits and Collections Article remains today essentially 
as adjusted by the bank lobby. 51 The final November 1951 draft 
altered the litigation posture of banks and their customers in the 
context of a wrongful payment over a stop order. Banks were 
now permitted to charge their customer's account and then to 
interpose defensively the rights of an available holder in due course 
in the customer's action against the bank. In sum, the bank lobby 
47. See supra notes 19-29 and accompanying text. 
48. See U.C.C. § 4-507 {Revisions of Articles 2, 4 & 9, Sept. 1950), 
reprinted in 11 U.C.C.: DRAFTs, supra note 31, at 383-84. This section read as 
follows: 
To prevent unjust enrichment, a bank which has paid a customer's 
item which it may not charge in full to his account may in an action: 
(a) against a prior holder who has received the payment, recover 
any part thereof due its customer or any prior party in respect of the 
transaction in which the customer of the depositary bank acquired the 
item; and 
(b) against the drawer, maker or acceptor recover any amount 
which would have been due from him on the item if payment had been 
refused. 
The bank has no right to charge the customer's account in respect of 
such cause of action. The bank may bring either or both such actions 
but may have only one satisfaction and any right to consequential or 
punitive damages remains with the customer or holder. 
Id. The provision denying the drawee bank the right to debit its customer's 
account last appeared in the September 3, 1951 Text Edition of Article 4 as § 
4-407. It was deleted in the Final Text Edition, dated November 1951. Compare 
12 U.C.C.: DRAFTs, supra note 31 at 188, with id. at 557. 
49. Beutel, supra note 4, at 359. 
50. Professor Beutel observed that the new draft was mailed to the members 
of the ALI and N.C.C.U.S.L. less than three weeks before the vote on the 
revisions. /d. & n.141. 
51. Compare U.C.C. §§ 4-101 to -504, with U.C.C. §§ 4-101 to -407 
(Final Text Ed. 1951), reprinted in 12 U.C.C.: DRAFTs, supra note 31, at 536-
57. 
1986] BANK-CUSTOMER RELATIONS 1291 
changed the pre-Code law to enhance the interests of financial 
institutions. 
Malcolm's discussion of the stop payment problem reveals the 
obfuscation accomplished by banking interests. In a 1952 law 
review article he explained that ''with the tremendous volume of 
items handled, it is impossible for banks to successfully receive, 
process and give effect to, each stop payment order that is re-
ceived. " 52 He then described the banks' use of exculpatory clauses 
in stop order forms and cited a report of the Committee on Bank 
Operations of the Section of Corporation, Banking and Business 
Law of the American Bar Association. 53 
[The Report] concluded that by the weight of authority 
such clauses are supported by adequate consideration and 
held not to be against public policy. The argument is further 
advanced that by drawing and issuing a check the depositor 
has set in motion a course of events looking toward the 
negotiation and payment of the check, and if he elects to 
change his mind he should assume the risk of not being 
able to reverse the process he has started in the absence 
of bad faith on the part of the bank.54 
There are two significant problems with Malcolm's analysis. First, 
he misrepresented the law; and second, the proximate causation 
and assumption of risk arguments contradict established liability 
theories and commercial paper policies. The ABA report cited by 
Malcolm reviewed the case law in only five states55 and the San 
Juan District of Puerto Rico. Although the report concluded that 
such clauses were upheld in Indiana, Massachusetts, and New 
York, it refused to express an opinion as to whether an exculpatory 
clause obviated "the criticism that there is no consideration for 
such agreement on the part of the depositor, or as to whether 
such a contract stands on a different or better footing with respect 
to public policy. " 56 A law review note published the same year as 
52. Malcolm, supra note 43, at 296. 
53. Committee on Bank Operations, ABA Section of Corporation, Banking 
and Business Law, Validity of Exculpatory Clauses in Stop Payment Notices, 5 
Bus. LAW. 101 (1949) [hereinafter cited as Exculpatory Clauses]. 
54. Malcolm, supra note 43, at 297 (emphasis added) (footnote deleted). 
55. The five states covered in the report were: Indiana, Massachusetts, 
New York, California, and Ohio. See Exculpatory Clauses, supra note 53, at 
101. California and Ohio were cited as invalidating such clauses in deposit 
contracts as void against public policy. See id. 
56. /d. at 107. 
1292 THE WAYNE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 32: 1279 
the Malcolm Article concluded that while exculpatory clauses might 
insulate banks from the consequences of inadvertence or accident, 
"[t]his is a release from absolute liability, but not from negligence. 
For negligent acts the bank will still be liable, whatever the wording 
of the release clause. " 57 Cases support this construction of pre-
Code law. ss While the essential distinction between "inadvertence 
or accident" and negligence may be difficult to formulate, or even 
imagine, the cases do not support the position that banks should 
be insulated from liability only when they have not acted in bad 
faith. 
Malcolm's causation and assumption of risk arguments are 
perhaps most troubling because they display the drafters' predis-
position toward the bank-customer relationship and thus explain 
the profinancial institution bias of Article 4. His assertion that 
the customer is in some way responsible for the wrongful payment 
because the customer is the cause in fact of the check's entering 
the collection process, imposes an unreasonabler burden on de-
positors. In effect, customers would become insurers of their banks' 
item clearance procedures. 59 It is inconceivable that such a position 
would be tenable in a Code that in very certain terms recognizes 
the efficacy of a stop payment right: 
The position taken by ... section [4-403] is that stopping 
payment is a service which depositors expect and are entitled 
to receive from banks notwithstanding its difficulty, incon-
venience and expense. The inevitable occasional losses 
through failure to stop should be borne by the banks as a 
cost of the business of banking. 60 
How could the section 4-403 stop payment right and the accom-
panying Comment coexist with the sweeping provision of subro-
gation rights in section 4-407? The answer is that the inclusion of 
section 4-403 in Article 4 is similar to the reference to "unjust 
enrichment" in section 4-407. It can only be explained as a remnant 
57. Note, supra note 43, at 590. 
58. See Comment, supra note 43 & the authorities cited therein. 
59. Moreover, Malcolm's argument proves too much. Given his predis-
position, perhaps a drawer should be liable for the amount of an item that the 
drawee pays over a forged payee's endorsement, see V.C.C. § 4-401, because the 
drawer is responsible for the check entering the collection process. 
60. /d. § 4-403 comment 2. 
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of the pre bank lobby version of Article 4, 61 as developed by a 
drafting committee less concerned with assuring the bank lobby 
virtually every conceivable benefit available through commercial 
paper legislation, 62 and more concerned with striking a balance 
between the interests of banks and their customers. 
B. New Payment Systems Law and the Provision of Individual 
Consumer Rights 
The argument that efficient processing of payments requires 
financial institutions to be afforded every deference in legislation 
or the financial world will come to an end is no longer convincing, 
and probably never was accurate. But such thinking supported the 
drafting of Article 4. Recent experience suggests that Armageddon 
is not a certain consequence of legislating that banks be solicitous 
of their customers' interests. Although consumer protection measures 
are not without their own costs, 63 proponents of such legislation 
argue that the benefits in justice and fairness offset those costs. 64 
The Federal Electronic Funds Transfer Act (E.F.T.A.),65 drafted 
along the lines suggested by the federal law governing credit card 
transactions, 66 acknowledges that its "primary objective ... is the 
provision of individual consumer rights. " 67 The scope of the Act 
includes preauthorized debits and credits68 and recurring telephone 
61. See, e.g., id. § 4-507 (Revisions of Articles 2, 4 & 9, Sept. 1950), 
reprinted in 1 I U.C.C.: DR.AF:rs, supra note 31, at 383-84 (expressly denying 
bank's "right" to charge the customer'sr account for payment over a valid stop 
order). 
62. For a brief discussion of the drafters' attempt to satisfy the New York 
banking interests, see Rapson, Book Review, 41 Bus. LAW. 675, 676 n.4, 677 
(1986) (reviewing F. Mn.LER & A. HARRELL, THE LAW OF MoDERN PAYMENT 
SYSTEMS AND NoTEs (1985)) (quoting a letter from Grant Gilmore to Donald J. 
Rapson (Oct. 8, 1980) stating: "Malcolm, who was a man of the highest personal 
integrity, understood that it was his function to do whatever was necessary to 
placate the New York group (who, nevertheless, refused to be placated)." (footnote 
omitted)). 
63. The disclosure and compliance burdens imposed on financial institu-
tions are significant. See N. PENNEY & D. BAKER, supra note 6, 1 11-02, at 
11-7 to -25. 
64. See Budnitz, The Finicky Computer, the Paperless Telex and the 
Fallible Swiss: Bank Technology and the Law, 25 B.C.L. REv. 259 (1984) 
(describing the "humanizers" approach to payments legislation and the role of 
technology); see also infra notes 187-95 and accompanying text. 
65. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1693-1693r (1982). 
66. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. §§ 1666-1666j (1982 & Supp. II 1984). 
67. 15 u.s.c. § 1693(b). 
68. SeeN. PENNEY & D. BAKER, supra note 6, 11 4.05[5][b), 5.01[1])[2]; 
15 U.S.C. § 1693e. 
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transactions,69 as well as automated teller machine and point-of-
sale systems. 70 The Act also establishes the liability of financial 
institutions for failing "to stop payment of a preauthorized transfer 
from a consumer's account when instructed to do so."71 The 
accompanying regulation explains that "[a] consumer may stop 
payment of a preauthorized electronic fund transfer from the 
consumer's account by notifying the financial institution orally or 
in writing at any time up to 3 business days before the scheduled 
date of the transfer. " 72 If the financial institution "unintentionally" 
fails to stop payment when properly instructed to do so, the 
E.F.T.A. provides that "the financial institution shall be liable 
for actual damages proved. " 73 Section 908 of the Act clarifies that 
the failure to honor a proper stop payment request is "an error"74 
and requires the financial institution to "correct the error ... 
including the crediting of interest where applicable.' '75 
The E.F. T .A., then, imposes the initial loss and perhaps the 
burden of initiating litigation 76 on the financial institution that 
failed to honor the stop payment order. The Act includes no 
subrogation provision as does UCC section 4-407.77 In addition, 
the E.F. T .A. exposes the financial institution to all "actual dam-
ages" proved, a phrase that has been construed under the UCC78 
to extend to emotional distress and other consequential damages. 79 
69. See N. PENNEY & D. BAKER, supra note 6, ~ 5.05(3][f), n.233. 
Nonrecurring telephone transactions are excepted by 15 U.S.C. § 1693a(6)(E). 
70. See 15 U.S.C. § 1693a(6) (describing scope of E.F.T.A.). 
71. Id. § 1693h(a)(3). 
72. 12 C.F.R. § 205.10(c) (1985). 
73. 15 U.S.C. § 1693h(c). 
74. An "error" is defined by the Act as " an unauthorized electronic fund 
transfer." Id. § 1693f(f)(l). A payment over a stop order is "unauthorized" and 
thus fits within the statutory definition of an "error." 
75. Id. § 1693f(b). 
76. See id. § 1693f(c) (requiring, in most circumstances, provisional recredit 
to the customer's account for amount of alleged error). Assuming the customer 
has received the recredit, the customer need only withdraw funds from the 
disputed account to force the bank into court for the recovery of its alleged 
loss. 
77. A consumer may thus avoid a payment and wrongfully retain the 
consideration received; the financial institution that has paid over the stop payment 
order is not subrogated to the rights of the payee. Similarly, if the consumer 
has a defense good against the recipient of the payment, the Act does not 
subrogate the financial institution to the rights of the consumer-customer. 
78. See V .C.C. § 4-402 (1977) ("Bank's Liability to Customer for Wrongful 
Dishonor"). 
79. See, e.g., Twin City Bank v. Issacs, 283 Ark. 127, 672 S.W.2d 651 
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To permit subrogation in the check collection process and not 
provide for it in the context of electronic funds transfers is 
unreasonable. Subrogation to the rights of the drawer or payee 
should be expressly provided in both bodies of law. Subrogation 
to the rights of a holder in due course should not be available. 
Both the check law and electronic funds transfer law should 
preclude a financial institution's debiting a consumer account to 
realize the benefits of that subrogation right. 80 
The drafters of the Uniform New Payments Code (U.N.P.C.), 
in the last draft publicly circulated, approached this formulation 
but did not impose on financial institutions the expense of initiating 
litigation to determine the viability of subrogation rights. 81 Unless 
that burden is unequivocally imposed on the financial institutions, 
they may use the subrogation theory to a much greater extent than 
contemplated by principles of unjust enrichment. Also, the U .N .P. C. 
would have left "[t]he burden of establishing the fact and amount 
(1984) (damages for mental suffering available under § 4-402 even when bank's 
wrongful dishonor not tantamount to level of culpability for intentional infliction 
of emotional distress); Kendall Yacht Corp. v. United Cal. Bank, 50 Cal. App. 
3d 949, 123 Cal. Rptr. 848 (1975) ("tortious" damages for emotional distress 
recoverable under § 4-402 and not precluded because "wrongful dishonor" may 
also embrace a contract claim); Bank v. Sims, 435 S.W.2d 57 (Ky. 1968) (§ 4-
402 codifies common law, which allowed recovery of both direct and consequential 
damages); Northern Bank v. Palmer, 525 S.W.2d 718 (Tex. Civ. App. 1975) 
(mental distress may be considered in awarding consequential damages under § 
4-402). 
80. The provision precluding a bank's debit of its customer's account in 
the September 3, 1951 draft of the U.C.C. has been previous discussed. See 
supra notes 44-51 and accompanying text. For the text of this provision, see 
supra note 48. 
81. See U.N.P.C., supra note 15, § 432, at 327. That section reads as 
follows: 
/d. 
If a payor account institution has paid an order of the drawer 
which has been stopped or reversed, or otherwise under circumstances 
giving a basis for objection by the drawer, to prevent unjust enrichment 
and only to the extent necessary to prevent loss to the account institution 
by reason of its payment of the order, the account institution shall be 
subrogated to the rights 
(a) the payee or other party to which payment was made, on the 
order or under the transaction out of which the order arose against the 
drawer; 
(b) the drawer, on the order or under the transaction out of which 
the order arose against the payee or party to which payment was made; 
and 
(c) any funds claimant with due-course rights on the order against 
the drawer. 
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of loss resulting from the payment of an order contrary to a 
binding stop order" on the customer. 82 The combination of this 
formulation from Article 4 of the UCC83 and the requirement of 
a provisional recredit pending resolution of the error from the 
E.F.T.A. is incongruous.84 
82. U.N.P.C., supra note 15, § 425, at 288. 
83. See V.C.C. § 4-403(1). 
84. The U.N.P.C. contains a recredit provision similar to that contained 
in the E.F.T.A. See U.N.P.C., supra note 15, § 302(2)(a). This section provides 
as follows: 
(2) The account institution shall investigate a!ld determine within 
sixty (60) days after receiving a notice of an error whether the alleged 
error occurred, and shall transmit the results of its investigation and 
determination to the customer, provided that if the account institution 
does not complete the investigation to the extent of its own records and 
transmit the results of such investigation to the customer pursuant to 
subsection (1) within ten (10) business days, the account institution: 
(a) shall make a provisional adjustment to the customer's account 
for the amount of the alleged error, or the maximum amount of recredit 
due to the customer if the alleged error is determined to be an error in 
fact, or $500, whichever is less, during the investigation (including interest 
where applicable), or, where the alleged error concerns an extension of 
credit, shall refrain during the investigation from taking any action to 
collect the amount disputed (including finance charges, late payment 
charges, or other charges computed on such amount) and not apply 
against the credit limit the amount indicated to be in error of $500, 
whichever is less .... 
!d. at 212-13. This section is similar to the E.F.T.A. recredit provision. Compare 
id., with 15 U.S.C. § 1693f(c) (discussed supra note 76). Unlike the E.F.T.A., 
however, which clearly gives consumers a genuine recredit " right," the U.N.P.C.'s 
incorporation of language similar to that contained in U.C.C. § 4-403(3) in 
U.N.P .C. § 425 dilutes significantly the proconsumer orientation of the U.N.P .C.'s 
recredit provision. U.N.P.C. § 425, like U.C.C. § 4-403(3), imposes the burden 
of proof on the customer, not on the bank. Professor Clark has described the 
§ 4-403(3) "fact and amount of loss" burden on bank customers as "a wonder 
of bank lobbying." B. CLARK, THE LAW OF BANK DEPOSITS, COLLECTIONS AND 
CREDIT CARDs, <I 2.6[2], at 2-48 (rev. ed. 1981). The principal problem with 
the provision is its uncertain and potentially harsh operation in connection with 
§ 4-407 subrogation rights. It is unclear what the customer must prove-whether 
the customer must show that a sufficiently precise stop order was issued, or must 
also establish that the payor's § 4-407 subrogation right would be unavailable 
against the customer on the facts of the particular case. The September 1950 
Draft of § 4-503, the predecessor to current § 4-403, described the "Customer's 
Right to Stop Payment" in substantially the same terms as the present formulation 
but without subsection (3). Compare U.C.C. § 4-507 (Revisions of Articles 2, 4 
& 9, Sept. 1950), reprinted in U.C.C.: DR.AFTs, supra note 31, at 383-84, with 
U.C.C. § 4-403. The burden to prove fact and amount of loss was not expressly 
imposed on the customer until the September 1951 Draft, the one profoundly 
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The U.N.P .C. drafters assembled a rule from diametrically 
opposed component parts (UCC and E.F.T.A.) and concluded with 
a patchwork that does not properly address the problem. They 
would have improved the law governing electronic fund transfers 
by providing a subrogation provision, but undermined that im-
provement by juxtaposing with it the requirement that the customer 
bear the burden of proving the fact and amount of loss. If future 
efforts to codify payments law are to succeed, the drafters must 
first develop a mature jurisprudential frame of reference. Only 
then can payments law achieve the necessary accommodation of 
the conflicting interests involved. A viable foundation for such a 
pursuit may be found in the principles of legal realism as expounded 
by Karl Llewellyn. 
influenced by the banking lobby. A 1954 commentary recognized that "it may 
be argued that under the Code the drawer makes out a prima facie case when 
he shows (1) a valid stop-payment order and (2) that a charge has been made 
to his account." Morrison & Sneed, Bank Collections: The Stop-Payment Trans-
action-A Comparative Study, 32 TEx. L. REv. 259, 316 (1954). However, the 
commentators find more convincing the illustration offered at the September 
1951 N.C.C.U.S.L. meeting on the U.C.C.: 
[S]ometimes a check "is stopped when there has been no failure of 
consideration, and the burden should be on the drawer of the check to 
show how much he has been damaged, which, in other words, means 
that if he gave a check for $1000 for some goods which were not as 
warranted, and they were only worth $500 but the bank wrongly paid 
the check anyway, he must show that the goods were worth only $500 
... due to the wrongful payment of the check .... " 
/d. at 316-17 (quoting National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State 
Laws, Proceedings in the Committee of the Whole, Uniform Commercial Code, 
Sept. 10-15, 1951, at 56-57 (remarks of Mr. Birbaum)) (on file at The Wayne 
Law Review). 
A federal district court in Massachusetts has read § 4-403(3) and § 4407 to 
impose the onerous burden on a customer "to avoid circuity of action." Universal 
C.I.T. Credit Corp. v. Guaranty Bank & Trust Co., 161 F. Supp. 790, 794 (D. 
Mass. 1958). District Judge Wyzanski concluded "that [the customer] is not 
allowed to recover because it has not borne its burden of showing that it suffered 
loss ... ;[drawer] suffered no loss because it would have been liable to [inter-
mediary bank] as a holder in due course in any event." !d. at 794-95. Not all 
of the cases have embraced the perspective of the N.C.C.U.S.L. illustration, 
however. The New York court in Thomas v. Marine Midland Tinkers Nat'l Bank, 
86 Misc. 2d 284, 381 N.Y.S.2d 797 (Civ. Ct. 1976), gave effect to the policy 
underlying § 4403 by granting judgment to the plaintiff-customer and imposing 
on the payor bank the burden of producing evidence that would show that the 
customer did not suffer loss. The facts reveal that the Thomas decision was 
particularly indulgent of the customer's rights; the plaintiff's stop order misi-
dentified the check number. The court considered the error de minimis, though 
perhaps it was not, from the perspective of the bank's computer. The § 4403 
formulation of the burden of proof is at least awkward and probably unjust. 
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III. JURISPRUDENCE AND CoMMERCIAL LAw 
Commentators have considered the jurispurdence of the Code 
from the viewpoint of legal philosophy85-jurisprudence "for 
the hundred. " 86 Several articles have suggested perspectives for 
practice under the Code, describing methods of construing partic-
ular provisions.87 Not since Llewellyn's death, however, has the 
efficacy of drafting commercial law from the legal realists' frame 
of reference been examined. A discussion of realism and its re-
lationship to commercial law is a prerequisite to appraising the 
value of applying realistic principles to payments law. The necessity 
and consequences of delegating responsibility for the several Articles 
of the UCC undermined Llewellyn's efforts to impress his under-
standing of legal realism on the entire Code.88 Nevertheless, Article 
2 demonstrates, to a considerable extent, the application of his 
views to the sale89 of goods.90 The realistic principles embodied in 
85. See, e.g., Carroll, Harpooning Whales, Of Which Karl N. Llewellyn 
Is The Hero Of The Piece; Or Searching For More Expansion Joints in Karl's 
Crumbling Cathedral, 12 B.C. INDUS. & CoM. L. REV. 139 (1970); Danzig, A 
Comment on the Jurisprudence of the U.C.C., 27 STAN. L. REv. 621 (1975); 
Leff, Unconscionability and the Code-The Emperor's New Clause, 155 U. PA. 
L.R. 485 (1967). 
86. See supra notes 8-10 and accompanying text for a discussion of 
Lewellyn's division of legal studies into three distinct levels, including "juris-
prudence for the hundred." 
87. Hawkland, Uniform Commercial "Code" Methodology, 1962 U. ILL. 
L.F. 291. 
88. See Carroll, supra note 85, at 151. Carroll explains that "it is impossible 
to assess accurately the degree to which Llewellyn lost control of the code or 
the extent to which his purposes were frustrated," especially since Llewellyn "did 
not write in detail on this subject." I d. Carroll then provides a quotation of 
Llewellyn's that reflects the drafters' disappointment in certain sections of the 
Code: "I am ashamed of it in some ways; there are so many pieces that I could 
make a little better; there are so many beautiful ideas that I tried to get in that 
would have been good for the law, but I was voted down." ld. at 152 (citing 
Llewellyn, Why a Commercial Code? 22 TENN. R. REv. 779, 784 (1953)). 
89. Article 2 is titled "Sales" and, by its terms, would seem to apply only 
to sales transactions, not leases or bailments. However, the scope provision, 
U.C.C. § 2-102 (1977), refers to "transactions in goods," and has been a ready 
source for the argument that Article 2 should be given broad application. See, 
e.g., Hertz Commercial Leasing Corp. v. Transportation Credit Clearing House, 
59 Misc. 2d 226, 298 N.Y.S.2d 392 (1969) (applying warranty provisions of 
Article 2 to a lease transaction by analogy), rev'd on other grounds, 64 Misc. 
2d 910, 316 N.Y.S.2d 585 (1970); see also Annot., 17 A.L.R. 3d 1010 (1968). 
90. Courts are not consistent in determining when a transaction is a sale 
of goods or services. Compare Gulash v. Stylarama, Inc., 33 Conn. Supp. 108, 
364 A.2d 1221 (1975) (installation of swimming pool is a service outside scope 
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Article 2 facilitate the use of tort analysis and endeavor to reflect 
and accommodate the unique nature of the commercial community. 
Nothing is peculiar to the law of sales that would compromise its 
service as a model for payments law. 91 As the commercial bar and 
academicians turn their attention to the codification of payments 
law, the approach utilized in the Sales Article must be considered. 
Succinctly, what has worked for sales may also work for payments. 
This portion of the Article formulates an essential principle of 
Llewellyn's legal realism, situation sense,92 and considers how the 
of Article 2), with Riffe v. Black, 548 S.W.2d 175 (Ky. 1977) (installation of 
swimming pool within scope of Article 2; warranty sections of sales provisions 
applicable). See Annot., 4 A.L.R. 4th 85 (1981). It has been observed that courts 
are not blind to the effects of applying Article 2 to the facts of a particular 
case. "Considerable judicial hostility has long existed as to the [§ 2-201] Statute 
of Frauds. A general disposition against its application to prevent proof of a 
contract is served by determining that a given set of facts is not within the scope 
of Article 2." Deusenbert, Strategies in Preparing, Interpreting and Managing 
Sales Contracts 6, 7, appearing in 19TH ANNUAL UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 
INSTITUTE (course materials) (March 6-8, 1986) (citing Computer Servicenter, Inc. 
v. Beacon Mfg. Co., 328 F. Supp. 653 (N.D.S.C. 1970) aff'd mem., 443 F.2d 
906 (4th Cir. 1971); Buttorf v. United Elec. Labs., Inc., 459 S.W.2d 581 (Ky. 
App. 1970); National Historic Shrines Found. v. Dali, 4 U.C.C. REP. SERV. 
(CALLAGHAN) 71 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1967)) (on file at The Wayne L. Review). 
91. The argument could be made that Article 2 is fundamentally distin-
guishable from Article 4 insofar as the relative bargaining positions of typical 
transactors is concerned. A buyer in a sales transaction may, and indeed usually 
will, be a seller in the next transaction. J .C. Penney buys from sellers and sells 
to buyers. Therefore, large merchant interests would support legislation that fairly 
accommodates the interests of both buyers and sellers. 
Payments law, however, is concerned with striking a balance between banks 
and their customers. Few customers act as banks, just as few banks act as 
consumers of bank services in the same way individuals and smaller businesses 
"consume" retail banking services. When the banks are considering payments 
legislation, then, it would not be difficult to support rules that protect bank 
interests at the expense of consumer interests. Such a posture would be efficacious 
until a coherent and effective consumer lobby formed. That dichotomy would 
explain why Articles 2 and 4 differ in their balancing of conflicting interests, 
but does not justify the inequitable balance that this Article argues resulted from 
the lobbying dynamics in the early 1950s. Article 2 provides an appJoach to 
balancing competing commercial interestsr that does not unduly favor one con-
stituency over another and, therefore, should inform the drafting of new payments 
law. 
92. Twining notes that Llewellyn's use of the term "situation sense" is 
obscure and suggests further that Llewellyn failed to use the term consistently: 
"[l]s [Llewellyn] referring to a faculty or to actual perception or the signification 
or meaning of a situation or to something else?" After a brief analysis, Twining 
concludes that "sense cannot mean faculty, but it could mean either 'the meaning 
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homogeneity of commercial interests may make possible the co-
herent application of tort principles to payment issues. 
Because the UCC is a code, it makes demands on attorneys 
not fully appreciated by those who perceive its provisions as a 
system of discrete answers to typical controversies. 93 Rarely is a 
commercial court constrained to reach a particular result under 
the most Llewellynesque provisions of Article 2. Instead, the 
sections invite a reexamination of the equities attending the par-
ticular facts in issue. "Article II . . . operated as a means of 
dictating a method. That method was designed to prompt decision 
not according to the letter or the logic of a statute or a juristic 
concept but rather according to the 'situation-reason. "'94 Though 
Llewellyn's elaboration of situation reason, or situation sense, has 
not provided a model of clarity, his persistent emphasis on the 
of the situation' or what would be sensible (i.e., judicious) in this situation. " 
Twining argues that lying within this definition of "situation sense" is 
evidence that Llewellyn "was lured by his flirtation with natural law into deviation 
from his normal stance as an empiricist and ethical relativist," because " meaning 
of the situation" gives rise to a metaphysical inquiry about "finding .. . immanent 
law . . . not known by empirical methods." Perhaps, though, Twining placed 
too much emphasis on the word "sense" and not enough on "situation." Indeed, 
he begins his discussion by defining the parameters of "sense" and then filtering 
the "situation" through that delimitation. The result is that Twining further 
obscures Llewellyn's phrase and turns the inquiry in a direction opposite of what 
Llewellyn intended. See W. TWINING, supra note 8, at 219-21. 
"Realism was never a philosophy [although] [i]t is persistently treated as 
such. But realism is a method which can serve any goal at all." Herein lies the 
importance of the word "situation." To deemphasize its meaning in favor of 
"sense" is to commit Twining's analytical mistake. Llewellyn, recognizing that 
realism and its corresponding terminology might be misinterpreted in just this 
way, cautioned that: "[the] main trouble with treating the descriptive or tech-
nological branch of a discipline as a philosophy is that any preliminary or partial 
work is likely to be viewed as if it were trying to be a whole, with negative 
implications read in, indeed read in even though they be denied." See K. 
LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 509-10, n.2 (1960). 
Llewellyn's "situation sense" found its way into the comments to U.C.C. § 2-
612 ("'Installment Contract' ; Breach"): 
Even where a clause speaks of "a separate contract for all purposes," 
a commercial reading of the language under the section on good faith 
and commercial standards requires that the singleness of the document 
and the negotiation, together with the sense of the situation, prevail 
over any uncommercial and legalistic interpretation. 
U.C.C. § 2-612 comment 3 (emphasis added). 
93. See Scott, supra note 18, at 738 ("Commercial law has become largely 
the province of the adept reader of statutes, and the methodology of the Code is 
the skill of working out language puzzles."). 
94. See Danzig, supra note 85, at 632. 
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immanent law of a fact pattern suggests that he considered situation 
sense to be a venerable juristic concepL For the commercial 
transactor and his counsel, nice questions of immanent justice do 
little to establish the contours of a deal or to reveal the best 
litigation posture when the deal falls apart. In The Common Law 
Tradition,95 Llewellyn. argued that situation sense has meaning on 
that pragmatic level. He used Justice Benjamin Cardozo'B 
MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co.96 opinion to describe his concept 
of situation sense.97 Llewellyn concluded that Cardozo's method 
reflected the "Grand Style" of adjudication. What can be distilled 
from Llewellyn's MacPherson section of The Common Law Tra-
dition formulates what Llewellyn endeavored to draft into Article 
2 of the Code.98 
Cardozo impressed Llewellyn by separating the principle or 
reason for a rule from the precedential authority: "That principle 
is then reformulated to fit the modern need, to solve the case in 
hand, and to guide the future, its reason being made as explicit 
as itself."99 Precedent is thereby "cleaned up." 100 If the statute 
or code is the only source of the law, the creative judge need not 
95. K. LLEWELLYN, supra note 92. 
96. 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916). 
97. To understand Llewellyn's demonstration of situation sense in 
MacPherson, it is important first to understand that Cardozo was developing the 
common law, not construing a code. 
98. Llewellyn was impressed with Cardozo's MacPherson opinion: 
Equally important, MacPherson v. Buick shows the "style of rea-
son" at its best, in full recrudescence, indeed in full recapture, both in 
the deciding and in the opinion-writing, and more than two generations 
ago. It displays, in addition, an identifiable manner and technique of 
opinion-writing peculiarly adapted to the present-day task of getting 
back to the reasoned creative method of the early nineteenth century, 
while both capitalizing on and reckoning with the insight and authority 
embodied in the intervening cases-while also disposing of such of them 
as may prove too remote from life because either the Formal Style or 
some other aberration has in the interim lost contact with life-needs or 
even made conscious rapprochement therewith seem immaterial. 
K. LLEWELLYN, supra note 92, at 431. Cardozo was a uniquely talented jurist, 
able to impose his creative abilities on the facts of a controversy to discover 
"the individual equities." /d. at 430. A Cardozo would not need a particular 
form of commercial statute to reach commercially sound decisions. His rhetorical 
prowess could manipulate the ostensibly formalistic statutory prescriptions and 
proscriptions as nimbly as he could impose his creative constructions on common 
law precedent. See G. GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT 62-63 (1974) (noting 
Cardozo's delight "in weaving gossamer spider webs of consideration"). 
99. K. LLEWELLYN, supra note 92, at 431. 
100. Id. 
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expend efforts "cleaning up" precedent, and the less skilled jurist 
will not be distracted by the need to distinguish troublesome 
precedent. The UCC, because it is a code, is consistent with what 
Llewellyn admired in MacPherson. In his important article con-
cerning UCC methodology, Chancellor Hawkland recognized that 
courts construing provisions of the Code should focus more on 
the language of the Act's provisions than on other courts' con-
struction of those provisions. 101 
Llewellyn praised Cardozo's ability to manipulate the scope of 
the liability principle to suit the facts of the case. Cardozo observed: 
"Precedents drawn from the days of travel by stage coach do not 
fit the conditions of travel to-day," 102 and Llewellyn remarked: 
"A question seen thus widens out; and, as is familiar, the resulting 
rule or principle must therefore also widen out, to fit the now 
perceived sense and need which only such a viewing of the question 
could have opened."103 Good commercial law, for Llewellyn, would 
be drafted ''to permit the continued expansion of commercial 
practices through custom, usage and agreement of the parties." 104 
101. Hawkland, supra note 87, at 292 {citing and quoting Gilmore, Legal 
Realsim: Its Cause and Cure, 70 YALE L.J. 1037, 1043 {1961) ("A 'Code' ... 
remains at all times its own best evidence of what it means: cases decided under 
it may be interesting, persuasive, cogent, but each new case must be referred for 
decision to the undefiled code text."). 
102. 217 N.Y. at 391, 111 N.E. at 1053. 
103. K. LLEWELLYN, supra note 92, at 432. 
104. U.C.C. § 1-102 states: 
(1) This Act shall be literally construed and applied to promote 
its underlying purposes and policies. 
(2) Underlying purposes and policies of this Act are 
(a) to simplify, clarify and modernize the law governing commercial 
transactions; 
(b) to permit the continued expansion of commercial practices 
through custom, usage and agreement of the parties; 
(c) to make uniform the law among the various jurisdictions. 
(3) The effect of provisions of this Act may be varied by agreement, 
except as otherwise provided in this Act and except that the obligations 
of good faith, diligence, reasonableness and care prescribed by this Act 
may not be disclaimed by agreement but the parties may by agreement 
determine the standards by which the performance of such obligations 
is to be measured if such standards are not manifestly unreasonable. 
(4) The presence in certain provisions of this Act of the words 
"unless otherwise agreed" or words of similar import does not imply 
that the effect of other provisions may not be varied by agreement 
under subsection (3). 
(5) In this Act unless the context otherwise requires 
(a) words in the singular number include the plural, and in the 
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Central concepts would be fluid, not static, and principle would 
"be recurred to constantly, so as to correct and readjust prece-
dent."105 Justice Cardozo's method is the type of analysis vindicated 
by Llewellyn's legal realism. The dynamic nature of commercial 
transactions mandates such a method just as it seems most acutely 
to defy static formulation and application: "To speak of an 
exclusively correct interpretation, one which would be the true 
meaning of the statute from the beginning to the end of its day, 
is altogether erroneous. '' 106 
Insofar as legal realism provides a means to discover and 
effectuate the goals and policies common among commercial trans-
actors, it facilitates code treatment of commercial transactions. A 
code is a "pre-emptive, systematic, and comprehensive enactment 
of a whole field of law."107 Before an area of law may be codified 
successfully, it must be delimited along functional lines: to be 
"comprehensive" an enactment must describe the rights and lia-
bilities in a discrete ''operational-body-of-law.'' 108 This requirement 
dictates that the set of laws "be sufficiently inclusive and inde-
pendent to enable it to be administered in accordance with its own 
basic policies." 109 
The attraction between commercial law and codification is a 
function of the insular (but not provincial in the pejorative sense) 
nature of commercial transactions. Llewellyn was impatient with 
comprehensive theories of human behavior that obscured the forest 
for the trees: "The effects of official action must then be different 
for different persons or groups, according to the interests, habits, 
complexes, occupations. " 110 To ignore distinctions that matter is 
plural include the singular; 
(b) words of the masculine gender include the feminine and the 
neuter, and when the sense so indicates words of the neuter gender may 
refer to any gender. 
105. K. LLEWELLYN, supra note 92, at 436. 
106. B. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 84-85 (1921) 
(quoting Kohler, Interpretation of Law, translated in 9 MoDERN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY 
SERIES 192 (1969)). 
107. Hawkland, supra note 87, at 292. 
108. See id. at 310. 
109. !d. (emphasis added). 
110. See K. Llewellyn, Legal Tradition and Social Science Method-A 
Realist's Critique, reprinted in K. LLEWELLYN, JURISPRUDENCE: REALISM IN THE-
ORY AND PRACTICE 77 (1962). "We live in a specialized, a differentiated society. 
We live in groups, in constellations, unlike, far from, hardly aware of most of 
those others who are the rest of us." !d. at 81. 
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to engage in "lump-concept thinking," 111 anathema to a Llewellyn 
realist. The business community's preoccupation with certainty, 
predictability, and stability, tempered but not undermined by a 
vigorous need and desire for flexibility in the application of law 
to facts, resulted in the development of a ''bar beginning then to 
specialize in clients (industrial clients who needed steadiness of 
law)." 112 Once such a group of lawyers and clients took form, a 
code could serve the group's idiosyncratic needs and aptitudes: 
In the commercial field "reasonable reckonability" of out-
come was most soundly based on the premise that in the 
market commercial necessity generates to a large extent its 
own uniformities of values and patterns of behavior; com-
mercial self interest spurs most businessmen to act within 
widely recognized leeways of decency and honesty: gross 
abuses tend to be self-defeating and can be checked in any 
case by making "honesty", "good faith", and "reasona-
bleness" the principal baselines for adjudication.113 
Commercial transactors often need less guidance to structure a 
transaction or even to pick up the pieces afterward than do similarly 
situated laymen. Even the Code's detractors have recognized the 
distinct characteristics of the commercial community: '' [Commer-
cial law] is at the margin of public law. It deals with a subcom-
munity ... whose members occupy a status position distinct from 
society at large [and] whose disputes are often resolved by informal 
111. See W. TwiNING, supra note 8, at 136. Twining writes: 
[T]here is a recurring theme of the need to be distrustful of broad 
generalizations and especially of "lump concepts." This theme reaches 
a crescendo in the analysis of "title." By "lump concepts" Llewellyn 
meant abstract legal conceptions, such as "right''. "possession", "con-
sideration", "title to goods", and "servant." . .. A general concept 
which "lumped together" socially disparate situations ... or which was 
used in different contexts to perform different functions ... was to be 
viewed with skepticism. 
/d. at 136-37. See also U.C.C. § 2-401 (describing the limited application of 
"title" concepts in Article 2). See generally K. Llewellyn, supra note 110, at 
95-97 (discussing "the role of concepts"). 
112. Llewellyn, On the Good, the True, the Beautiful, in Law, 9 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 224, 240 (1942). 
113. W. TwiNING, supra note 8, at 336. "Implicit in this view is a belief 
that legal rules have a more marginal role to play in generating business expec-
tations than some critics of the Code allow and that tight drafting will often be 
at least as likely to defeat commercial expectations as provide a basis for them." 
/d. 
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negotiation or in private forums." 114 It is not necessary that all 
groups concerned with the commercial law share the same level 
of sophistication, so long as substantial differences in levels of 
sophistication are made part of the calculus used to determine the 
transactors' relative standards of care. 115 
The merchant provisions in Article 2 evidence that all affected 
transactors need not have identical, or even nearly identical, in-
terests and levels of sophistication for comprehensive codification 
of an entire field of law to work. 116 It is enough that the parties 
have a sufficient identity of interests in particular recurring trans-
actions to agree upon certain fundamental "uniformities of values 
and patterns of behavior.'' 117 Commercial law drafted from the 
perspective of only one of the affected interest groups may obscure 
the object of commercial codification. The resulting legislation will 
not achieve an equilibrium; it will sacrifice the balance that a true 
accommodation of the opposing interests can accomplish. The 
tension produced by the opposition of competing interests may 
serve the needs of commerce by spawning flexible yet certain 
legislation that is responsive to the interests of the transactors and 
the exigencies of varied circumstances. 118 Llewellyn's legal realism 
114. Danzig, supra note 85, at 622. 
115. U.C.C. § 2-104(1), the "merchant" definition, illustrates well how a 
commercial statute can consider varying levels of transactor sophistication without 
compromising the demands for certainty and stability in commercial law. The 
comment to the provision explains that the merchant concept is fluid: 
The professional status under the definition may be based upon spec-
ialized knowledge as to the goods, specialized knowledge as to business 
practices, or specialized knowledge as to both and which kind of 
specialized knowledge may be sufficient to establish the merchant status 
is indicated by the nature of the provisions. 
U.C.C. § 2-104 comment 2 (emphasis added). U.C.C. §§ 2-103, 2-104, 2-201, 2-
205, 2-207, 2-209, 2-312, 2-314, 2-327, 2-403, 2-509, 2-603, 2-605, and 2-609 
refer to "merchants." Opening mail and making representations regarding the 
integrity of goods offered for sale are essentially different. Article 2 recognizes 
that difference and requires courts to acknowledge it in determining the respon-
sibilities of transactors. U.C.C. § 2-104, comment 2. Thus, the provisions afford 
courts an opportunity to avoid making bad law when confronted by hard cases. 
116. For a discussion of the impact of Karl Llewellyn on the development 
of the Article 2 merchant rules, see Hillinger, The Article 2 Merchant Rules: 
Karl Llewellyn~s Attempt to Achieve the Good~ the True~ the Beautiful in 
Commercial Law, 73 GEo. L.J. 1141 (1985). 
117. W. TWINING, supra note 8, at 336. 
118. Legislation that vindicates the vested interests of one group to the 
detriment of others affected by recurringr transactions will, if Article 4 provides 
an accurate example, rely upon formalism, an inappropriate predisposition for 
1306 THE WAYNE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 32:1279 
supplies the method for discovering the proper balance of interests 
among the various parties to typical payment transactions. 119 
IV. THE SALES LAW PERSPECTIVE: TORT ANALYSIS AND 
DRAFTING WITH A Focus ON FACTUAL DETERMINATIONS 
A. The Relationship of Tort and Contract 
It has become axiomatic that our commercial law is a 
branch of the law of contracts. 120 The apparent close relation-
ship between commercial law and contract law seems substan-
tial, in part, because Article 2 of the UCC governs one type 
of contract, the sales contract. Indeed, the superficial similar-
ities between the two fields belie a fundamental affinity. Sev-
eral provisions of the Code reinforce such apparent parallels: 
a body of law that would recognize as its premise "'reasonable reckonability' 
of outcome." /d. 
/d. 
The Code is founded not only on faith in the capacity of the business 
community for satisfactory self-regulation within a framework of very 
broadly drafted rules, but also on a faith in judges to make honest, 
sensible commercially well-informed decisions once they have been given 
some base-lines for judgment. Thus "reckonability" can be hoped for 
if judges can be expected to act in accordance with business expectations; 
uniformity within the leeway of broad rules will be promoted by uni-
formities of expectations, values and practices within the commercial 
world. 
One-sided legislation provides a poor model for subsequent codification 
efforts. In the case of payments law, the financial institution power-play that 
resulted in Article 4 has occasioned an equal and opposite reaction from the 
representatives of consumer interests in credit card and electronic funds transfer 
law. See supra text accompanying notes 63-84. Consequently, neither Article 4 
nor the E.F.T.A. serves properly the interests of all affected transactors. The 
chauvinism of both Article 4 and the E.F.T.A. renders them an inadequate model 
for legislation that would endeavor to balance the interests of banks and their 
customers. 
119. See supra note 92 for a discussion of Llewellyn's approach to legal 
realism as "method.' ' 
120. It is not atypical to find that "Contracts" and "Sales" are taught in 
the same first year law school course. Indeed, many professors of commercial 
law also teach contract law. See Mooney, Old Kontract Principles and Karl's 
New Kode: An Essay on the Jurisprudence of Our New Commercial Law, 11 
Vn.L. L. REv. 213 (1966) (arguing that the U.C.C. has "mortally wounded" the 
general theory of contract by replacing Langdellian formalism with Karl Llew-
ellyn's legal realism). 
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Article 2 contains a statute of frauds, 121 a parol evidence 
121. Compare U.C.C. § 2-201 (1977) which provides: 
(1) Except as otherwise provided in this section a contract for the 
sale of goods for the price of $500 or more is not enforceable by way 
of action or defense unless there is some writing sufficient to indicate 
that a contract for sale has been made between the parties and signed 
by the party against whom enforcement is sought or by his authorized 
agent or broker. A writing is not insufficient because it omits or 
incorrectly states a term agreed upon but the contract is not enforceable 
under this paragraph beyond the quantity of goods shown in such 
writing. 
(2) Between merchants if within a reasonable time a writing in 
confirmation of the contract and sufficient against the sender is received 
and the party receiving it has reason to know its contents, it satisfies 
the requirements of subsection (1) against such party unless written 
notice of objection to its contents is given with 10 days after it is 
received. 
(3) A contract which does not satisfy the requirements of subsection 
(1) but which is valid in other respects is enforceable 
(a) if the goods are to be specially manufactured for the buyer 
and are not suitable for sale to others in the ordinary course of the 
seller's business and the seller, before notice of repudiation is received 
and under circumstances which reasonably indicate that the goods are 
for the buyer, has made either a substantial beginning of their manu-
facture or commitments for their procurement; 
(b) if the party against whom enforcement is sought admits in his 
pleading, testimony or otherwise in court that a contract for sale was 
made, but the contract is not enforceable under this provision beyond 
the quantity of goods admitted; 
(c) with respect to goods for which payment has been made and 
accepted or which have been received and accepted (Sec. 2-606)[,] 
with the 1676 Act for the Prevention of Fraud and Perjuries, 29 Car. II, ch. 3, 
III Stat. at Large 385, 386, which provides in part: 
IV. And be it further enacted by the Authority aforesaid, That 
from and after the said four and twentieth Day of June no Action shall 
be brought [(1)] whereby to charge any Executor or Administrator upon 
any special Promise, to answer Damages out of his own Estate; (2) or 
whereby to charge the Defendant upon any special Promise to answer 
for the Debt, Default, or Miscarriage of another Person; (3) or to charge 
any Person upon any Agreementr made upon Consideration of Marriage; 
(4) or upon any Contract [f]or Sale of Lands, Tenements or Heredi-
taments, or any Interest in or concerning them; (5) or upon any 
Agreement that is not to be performed within the Space of one Year 
from the making thereof; (6) unless the Agreement upon which such 
Action shall be brought, or some Memorandum or Note thereof, shall 
be in Writing, and signed by the Party to be charged therewith, or some 
other Person thereunto by him lawfully authorized. 
XVII. And be it further enacted by the Authority aforesaid, That 
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rule122 a modification of the common law "mirror image" rule123 
from and after the said four and twentieth Day of June no Contract 
for the Sale of any Goods, Wares and Merchandizes, for the Price of 
ten Pounds Sterling or upwards, shall be allowed to be good, except 
the Buyer shall accept Part of the Goods so sold, and actually receive 
the same, or give something in earnest to bind the Bargain, or in Part 
of Payment, or that some Note or Memorandum in Writing of the said 
Bargain be made and signed by the Parties to be charged by such 
Contract, or their Agents thereunto lawfully authorized. 
122. Compare U.C.C. § 2-202, which provides: 
Terms with respect to which the confirmatory memoranda of the 
parties agree or which are otherwise set forth in a writing intended by 
the parties as a final expression of their agreement with respect to such 
terms as are included therein may not be contradicted by evidence of 
any prior agreement or of a contemporaneous oral agreement but may 
be explained or supplemented 
(a) by course of dealing or usage of trade (Section 1-205) or by 
course of performance (Section 2-208); and 
(b) by evidence of consistent additional terms unless the court 
finds the writing to have been intended also as a complete and exclusive 
statement of the terms of the agreement[,] 
with 3 A. CoRBIN, CoNTRACTS § 573 (1960) (footnote omitted), which states: 
When two parties have made a contract and have expressed it in a 
writing to which they have both assented as the complete and accurate 
integration of that contract, evidence, whether parol or otherwise, of 
antecedent understandings and negotiations will not be admitted for the 
purpose of varying or contradicting the writing. 
123. Compare U.C.C. § 2-207, which provides: 
(1) A definite and seasonable expression of acceptance or a written 
confirmation which is sent within a reasonable time operates as an 
acceptance even though it states terms additional to or different from 
those offered or agreed upon, unless acceptance is expressly made 
conditional on assent to the additional or different terms. 
(2) The additional terms are to be construed as proposals for 
addition to the contract. Between merchants such terms become part of 
the contract unless: 
(a) the offer expressly limits acceptance to the terms of the offer; 
(b) they materially alter it; 
(c) notification of objection to them has already been given or is 
given within a reasonable time after notice of them is received. 
(3) Conduct by both parties which recognizes the existence of a 
contract is sufficient to establish a contract for sale although the writings 
of the parties do not otherwise establish a contract. In such cases the 
terms of the particular contract consist of those terms on which the 
writings of the parties agree, together with any supplementary terms 
incorporated under any other provisions of this Act[,] 
with RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 60, 61 (1979), which state: 
[§ 60] If an offer prescribes the place, time or manner of acceptance 
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and a provision that adjusts the preexisting duty rule. 124 Notwith-
standing the contract law terminology employed, those vee sec-
tions are better understood in terms of tort rather than traditional 
contract conceptions. Most of Article 2 lends itself to such an ap-
proach.125 Over a decade ago, Professor Grant Gilmore demon-
its terms in this respect must be complied with in order to create a 
contract. If an offer merely suggests a permitted place, time or manner 
of acceptance, another method of acceptance is not precluded. 
[§ 61} An acceptance which requests a change or addition to the terms 
of the offer is not thereby invalidated unless the acceptance is made to 
depend on an assent to the changed or added terms. 
Comment: 
a. Interpretation of acceptance. An acceptance must be unequi-
vocal. But the mere inclusion of words requesting a modification of the 
proposed terms does not prevent a purported acceptance from closing 
the contract unless, if fairly interpreted, the offeree's assent depends on 
the offeror's further acquiescence in the modification. 
124. Compare U.C.C. § 2-709, which provides: 
(1) An agreement modifying a contract within this Article needs 
no consideration to be binding. 
(2) A signed agreement which excludes modification or rescission 
except by a signed writing cannot be otherwise modified or rescinded, 
but except as between merchants such a requirement on a form supplied 
by the merchant must be separately signed by the other party. 
(3) The requirements of the statute of frauds section of this Article 
(Section 2-201) must be satisfied if the contract as modified is within 
its provisions. 
(4) Although an attempt at modification or rescission does not 
satisfy the requirements of subsection (2) or (3) it can operate as a 
waiver. 
(5) A party who has made a waiver affecting an executory portion 
of the contract may retract the waiver by reasonable notification received 
by the other party that strict performance will be required of any term 
waived, unless the retraction would be unjust in view of a material 
change of position in reliance on the waiver[,] 
with J. CALAMARI, CoNTRACTS § 4-7 (1977) (footnotes omitted), which states: 
As a general proposition the courts have ruled that where a party 
does or promises to do what he is already legally obligated to do or 
promises to refrain from doing or refrains from doing what he is not 
legally privileged to do he has not incurred detriment. The preexisting 
duty need not be contractual. Thus, for example, if one promises to 
pay his or her spouse a thousand dollars at the end of the year if the 
spouse carried out the obligations of the marriage, the spouse would 
not be entitled to the money because the spouse would merely have 
performed a pre-existing legal duty. So also a sheriff may not obtain a 
reward for the capture of a criminal if the capture is within the general 
scope of his duties. 
125. See, e.g., infra text accompanying notes 153-73. 
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strated the consequences of what Corbin, 126 Llewellyn, 127 and even 
Holmes128 had appreciated years before, ''the fusing of contract and 
tort in a unified theory of civil obligation." 129 Contract law replaces 
abstraction for analysis; it is '''what is left in the law relating to 
agreements when all particularities of person and subject-matter are 
removed.'"130 The area of legal analysis that focuses on the partic-
ularities, and indeed makes them determinative, is tort law .131 One 
well-read in tort cases would quickly conclude that the doctrine of 
126. Arthur Corbin is generally considered an important precursor to the 
Realists, due primarily to his interest in empirical, historical, and doctrinal studies. 
See G. GILMORE, supra note 98, at 79-80; W. TWINING, supra note 8, at 27-34. 
For example, these studies revealed that the formalistic contract doctrine of 
"consideration" was not uniformly employed by courts in resolving contract 
disputes. Indeed, courts often employed various theories of "estoppel" to enforce 
promises that were not supported by consideration. See G. Gn.MORE, supra note 
98, at 58-65. Such promises, of course, would not have been enforced under the 
formal law of "contracts" and represented the existence of a "reliance interest" 
enforcement theory operating outside the scope of traditional contract law. See 
id. at 71; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 (1979) (providing for 
promissory estoppel). 
127. See Llewellyn, On Warranty of Quality, and Society, 36 CoLUM. L. 
REv. 699, 713 (1936) (describing the regulation of commerce as a progressive 
culmination of conditions, needs, and theories ranging from arm's-length trans-
action, tort, contract, res ipsa loquitur, and third party warranty to central 
regulation by guild or state). 
128. See O.W. HoLMES, THE COMMON LAw 13 (Belknap Press ed. 1963) 
("But it must be remembered that the distinction between tort and breaches of 
contract, and especially between remediesr for the two, is not found ready 
made."); see also Sullivan, Punitive Damages in the Law of Contract: The Reality 
and the Illusion of Legal Change, 61 MINN. L. REv. 207, 252 (1977), stating: 
[R]ecent decisions sanctioning the award of punitive damages in contract 
do not manifest much concern as to whether the plaintiffs claim falls 
on the tort or contract side . . . . [IJt suggests that the most important 
question ... may be not whether punitive damage awards are consistent 
with contract damage principles, but rather, what is the likely effect of 
the recent cases on the continued integrity of distinctions between contract 
and tort, and what are the implications of undermining those distinctions. 
129. G. GILMORE, supra note 98, at 90. Professor Gilmore stated: 
It is not only on the products liability front that the erosion of the 
negligence idea has been proceeding. Indeed the decline and fall of the 
nineteenth century idea that tort liability is, or should be, based on 
negligence or other fault matches the decline and fall of nineteenth 
century considerationr and contract theory . . . . 
ld. at 94. 
130. /d. at 6 (quoting L. FRIEDMAN, CONTRACT LAW IN AMERICA 20 (1965). 
131. The central concepts of tort law are foreseeability, the reasonable 
person standard, and evaluations of proximate causation by reference to objective 
criteria. See W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, TORTS §§ 43, 32, 42. 
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stare decisis is respected more in the breach than the observance: 
concepts and "limitations" of causes of action can only be under-
stood by reference to the particularities, the idiosyncratic elements 
that distinguish one case from another. 132 What "rules" there are 
provide guidance rather than dispositive answers. 133 
What really matters is this, that the judge is under a duty, 
within the limits of his power of innovation, to maintain 
a relation between law and morals, between the precepts 
of jurisprudence and those of reason and good conscience. 
I suppose it is true in a certain sense that this duty was 
never doubted. One feels at times, however, that it was 
obscured by the analytical jurists, who, in stressing verbal 
niceties of definition, made a corresponding sacrifice of 
emphasis upon the deeper and finer realities of ends and 
aims and functions. 134 
Technical competence comes easier than the development of 
good situation sense. However, the better lawyers and judges, those 
comfortable with the Grand Style of legal analysis, would be 
uncomfortable if constrained by statutory law that championed 
form over substance. In the grand tradition of legal argument 
''the rule follows where its reasons leads; where the reason stops, 
there stops the rule."13s Justice Cardozo wrote disparagingly of 
rules that would compel results without reference to reason. 136 He 
was concerned that rules could mandate unconscious, mechanical 
determination of results and acknowledged the "bulk and pressure 
of the rules" that would inhibit the creative energy of judges. 
Notwithstanding the tendency of legislatures to accommodate for-
malistic construction of statutes and the analytical jurists' preoc-
cupation with the mechanical application of law to facts, responsible 
courts and the attorneys appearing before them must innovate: 137 
132. See Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel, 50 MINN. L. REv. 791, 802 
(1966) ("No one disputed that the 'warranty' was a matter of strict liability. No 
one denied that where there was no privity, liability to the consumer could not 
sound in contract and must be a matter of tort. Why not, then ... strict liability 
in tort ... ?"). 
133. See supra text accompanying notes 102-05. 
134. B. CARDozo, supra note 106, at 133-34 (footnote omitted). 
135. K. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BusH 157-58 (1960) (emphasis in orig-
inal). 
136. See B. CARDozo, supra note 106, at 84. 
137. !d. at 136-38. 
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''within the confines of [remaining] open spaces ... choice moves 
with a freedom which stamps its action as creative.'' 138 As in eating 
a pair of shoes, indeed the best parts are the holes. 139 And the 
holes are inevitable; 140 those inevitable gaps provide the stuff of 
law, the material of judicial opinions. 
B. The Contrast Between Tort and Contract Principles in the 
ucc 
The Code's rules provide more guidance and certainty than is 
available from the common law system of precedent. 141 Rather 
than prepackaging an invariable conclusion to facts "marshalled"142 
in a particular way, Article 2 is drafted so that transactors' and 
courts' conceptions of justice may be effectuated. 143 The "true 
code" concept, 144 the elaborate definitions and thorough system 
138. Id. at 115. 
139. See Fuller, The Case of the Speluncean Explorers, 62 HARV. L. REv. 
616, 634 (1949). In Fuller's hypothetical case designed to explore divergent 
jurisprudential traditions, it is noted that the perspective of one of the justices 
was similar to that of a man who ate a pair of shoes. "Asked how he liked 
them, he replied that the part he liked best was the holes. That is the way my 
[fellow Supreme Court Justice] feels about statutes; the more holes they have in 
them the better he likes them. In short, he doesn't like statutes." /d. at 634. 
140. See B. CARDozo, supra note 106, at 16. 
141. SeeK. LLEWELLYN, supra note 92, at 62-63, concerning "The Leeways 
of Precedents" in the common law system. Chancellor (then Professor) Hawkland 
recognized that the Code addresses the shortcomings of stare decisis by requiring 
courts to consistently refer to the statute and by distracting courts' attention 
from case law under the Code. See Hawkland, supra note 87, at 292 (citing 
Gilmore, supra note 110, at 1043). 
142. "[T]he tort law ... is relatively unimportant in most tort cases. The 
successful tort lawyer has never been a specialist in law. His specialty lies in 
marshalling and presenting facts." Hawkland, supra note 87, at 294 n.11. 
143. Karl Llewellyn stated: 
[A]ny reframing of particular legal doctrines, any addition to or clari-
fication of the techniques of decision, must not only better serve control 
of arbitrariness and guidance to justice, but must also satisfy men's 
craving for reasonable certainty of form as well as substance, and for 
dignity of process as well as dignity of result. 
Llewellyn, On Reading and Using the Newer Jurisprudence, 40 CoLUM. L. REv. 
581, 610 (1940) (emphasis in original). 
144. See Hawkland, supra note 87, at 292, which states: 
A "code" is a pre-emptive, systematic, and comprehensive enactment 
of a whole field of law. It is pre-emptive in that it displaces all other 
law in its subject area . . . . It is systematic in that all of its parts, 
arranged in an orderly fashion and stated with a consistent terminology, 
form an interlocking, integrated body, revealing its own plan and 
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of cross referencing, provide the "certainty of form" and "dignity 
of process" in the UCC. However, it is the language of the 
individual provisions, the guidance of the comments, 145 and the 
application of the Grand Style of adjudication that guarantee 
"certainty of substance" and "dignity of result." The Code's 
provisions work best when they reflect "a consideration of the 
nature of the particular transaction as a practical matter.'' 146 Article 
2 illustrates the efficacy of this focus. 
The language of Justice Cardozo's tort analysis is familiar to 
those who have focused their attention on sales transactions: 
The master in the discharge of his duty to protect the 
servant against harm must exercise the degree of care that 
is commonly exercised in like circumstance by men of 
ordinary prudence. The triers of the facts in determining 
whether that standard has been attained must consult the 
habits of life, the every day beliefs and practices, of the 
men and women about them. 147 
containing its own methodology. It is comprehensive in that it is 
sufficiently inclusive and independent to enable it to be administered in 
accordance with its own basic policies. 
/d. (footnote omitted); see also, Alces, supra note 3, at 89, which states: 
UCC drafters ... expended considerable effort formulating a juris-
prudence of commercial codification and applying it to the provisions 
of the UCC. Their perspective was founded on concepts of legal realism 
and, as a result, they established commercial procedures that make the 
UCC more a restatement of expedient commercial practices than an 
effort to modify business custom. 
145. Some writers have focused on the comments as a source of guidance 
in resolving Code disputes. See, e.g., McDonnell, Purposive Interpretation of the 
Uniform Commercial Code: Some Implications for Jurisprudence, 126 U. PA. 
L. REv. 795, 797-98 (1978) ("The theory of purposive interpretation is rooted 
in the concept of law as a means to select social ends-a method of social 
engineering. It seeks to define legal standards in terms of the purpose they are 
designed to implement."). Further, "the drafters' attempt to use the commentary 
to facilitate purposive construction was linked with the underlying goal of 
uniformity ...• The official commentary indicates that, at least at times, artic-
ulated purpose is to control statutory text in Code interpretation." /d. at 800. 
146. O.W. HoLMES, supra note 128, at 283. Holmes felt that "the most 
important element of decision is not any technical, or even any general principle 
of contracts, but a consideration of the nature of the particular transaction as 
a practical matter." /d. Moreover, "[a]n answer cannot be obtained from any 
general theory . . . . But the grounds of decision are purely practical, and can 
never be elicited from grammar or from logic." /d. at 264. 
147. B. CARDozo, supra note 106, at 63. 
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Likewise, "Good Faith" in the case of an Article 2 merchant 
means "honesty in fact and the observance of reasonable com-
mercial standards of fair dealing in the trade." 148 Indeed, there 
may be no better example of the disparity between Article 2 and 
the Commercial Paper/Bank Collections Articles than the "good 
faith" provisions governing transactions in each Article. This 
conflict depicts well the tension between the two drafting predis-
positions and biases as well as the political consequences of choosing 
one style over the other. Section 1-201(19) defines "good faith" 
as "honesty in fact in the conduct or transaction concerned." 149 
This provision, the so called "pure heart-empty head'' standard, 
is effective in all Articles of the UCC. Article 2, however, establishes 
an enhanced, objective standard. 150 The focus on reasonableness 
illustrates the influence of Llewellyn's legal realism. The intentional 
exclusion of a similar provision in an early draft of Article 3 
concerning holders in due course reveals the predisposition of those 
who lobbied against it.151 Although the objective standard may remain 
148. See U.C.C. § 2-103(1)(b) (1977). 
149. Jd. § 1-201(19). 
150. ld. § 2-103(1)(b) provides: "In this Article unless the context otherwise 
requires ... '(g]ood faith' in the case of a merchant means honesty in fact and 
the observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing in the trade." 
151. Professor Braucher wrote: 
An early draft of the Revised Sales Act sought to add a requirement 
that action by a merchant or banker, to be in good faith, be "taken 
in reasonable course of business"; in early drafts of the Code this 
became a provision that "good faith includes observance by a person 
of the reasonable commercial standards of any business or trade in 
which he is engaged." The ABA Section objected that this language 
was ambiguous and might be read to freeze commercial practices, and 
the editorial board agreed to limit the general definition of "good faith" 
to honesty in fact, using more specific language for any case where a 
party was required to meet reasonable commercial standards. The result 
was that such specific provisions were inserted in several places. Perhaps 
most important was the provision in section 2-103 that throughout 
Article 2-Sales "'good faith' in the case of a merchant includes the 
observance of reasonable commercial standards," and the provision in 
section 3-302 that to be a holder in due course of commercial paper 
the holder must take "in good faith including the observance of the 
reasonable commercial standards of any business in which the holder 
may be engaged.'' 
The provision as to holders in due course was perhaps the item 
most vigorously discussed in the New York hearings. On behalf of the 
Chase Bank it was said that it revived the rule of Gill v. Cubitt [3 B. 
& C. 466, 107 Eng. Rep. 806 (1824)]. The sponsors asserted that the 
provision merely made reasonable commercial standards relevant on the 
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in the commercial paper context by operation of the "notice" 
provisions, 152 the fact that commercial reasonableness is expressly 
made determinative in Article 2 but expurgated from the com-
mercial paper setting corroborates the thesis of this Article. 
Perhaps one of the best examples of what Llewellyn was 
up to in his application of realistic principles to the law of 
sales is found in the provisions dealing with tender, acceptance, 
rejection, and revocation of goods-the UCC "Tarr"-Baby.JS3 
issue of good faith, in accordance with precedent. A third view was 
that it would be a rare case where the presence of the controverted 
language would affect the outcome. The one case in which that language 
was considered by a Pennsylvania court supports the third view; and 
that view probably influenced the decision of the editorial board to yield 
in Supplement No. 1 by deleting the reference to reasonable commercial 
standards. 
The New York commission approved the deletion of the reference 
to reasonable commercial standards in the definition of holder in due 
course. With respect to the comparable provision in Article 2-Sales, the 
commission recommended that the definition of good faith be revised 
to emphasize reasonable standards of fair dealing in the trade rather 
than reasonable standards of care. That recommendation was consistent 
with an earlier suggestion by the ABA Section that good faith might 
well include some element to "commercial decency" and with a reference 
by the New York Court of Appeals to "the good old rule that there is 
in every contract an implied covenant of fair dealing." The change was 
made in the 1956 revision. 
Braucher, The Legislative History of the Uniform Commercial Code, 58 COLUM. 
L. REv. 798, 812-13 (1958) (footnotes omitted). 
152. See U.C.C. §§ 1-201(25), 3-302, 3-304. Whether a holder has taken 
an instrument without notice of claims or defenses to payment on the instrument 
is to be determined by reference to objective indicia. A holder has taken with 
notice, and cannot be a holder in due course, if, circumstances surrounding the 
holder's acquisition of the paper indicate that the holder had "reason to know" 
of the existence of a claim or defense. Id. § 1-201(25). Several courts have 
adopted the "inferable knowledge test" of notice. See, e.g. , Eldon's Super Fresh 
Stores, Inc. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 296 Minn. 130, 207 
N.W.2d 282 (1973); Mid-Continent Nat'l Bank v. Bank of Independence, 523 
S.W.2d 569 (Mo. App. 1975); O.P. Ganjo, Inc. v. Tri-Urban Realty Co., 108 
N.J. Super. 517, 261 A.2d 722 (1969). Another approach applies a "duty to 
inquire" test. See, e.g., Winter & Hirsch, Inc. v. Passarelli, 122 Ill. App. 2d 
372, 259 N.E.2d 312 (1970); Kaw Valley State Bank & Trust Co. v. Riddle, 219 
Kan. 550, 549 P.2d 927 (1976); Sun 'N Sand, Inc. v. United Cal..Bank, 21 Cal. 
3d 671, 582 P.2d 920, 148 Cal. Rptr. 329 (1978); see also W. HAWKLAND & L. 
LAWRENCE, U.C.C. SERIES § 3-304:05 (Art. 3) (1984) (describing the inferable 
knowledge test as the majority rule). 
153. See Whaley, Tender, Acceptance, Rejection and Revocation-The 
U.C.C. 's "Tarr',-Baby, 24 DRAKE L. REv. 52 (1974), in which the U.C.C. rules 
concerning tender, acceptance, rejection, and revocation are referred to acron-
ymously as the "Tarr" sections. 
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Consideration of sections 2-508, 154 2-601, 155 and 2-612156 il-
lustrates the style of Article 2. Section 2-601 is the Article 
2 "perfect tender" rule. 1 57 The provision has received con-
siderable attention in the legal -periodicals 1 ss as well as in the 
154. U.C.C. § 2-508 provides: 
(1) Where any tender or delivery by the seller is rejected because 
non-conforming and the time for performance has not yet expired, the 
seller may seasonably notify the buyer of his intention to cure and may 
then within the contract time make a conforming delivery. 
(2) Where the buyer rejects a non-conforming tender which the 
seller had reasonable grounds to believe would be acceptable with or 
without money allowance the seller may if he seasonably notifies the 
buyer have a further reasonable time to substitute a conforming tender. 
155. /d. § 2-601 provides: 
Subject to the provisions of this Article on breach in installment 
contracts (Section 2-612) and unless otherwise agreed under the sections 
on contractual limitations of remedy (Sections 2-718 and 2-719), if the 
goods or the tender of delivery fail in any respect to conform to the 
contract, the buyer may 
(a) reject the whole; 
(b) accept the whole; 
(c) accept any commercial unit or units and reject the rest. 
156. /d. § 2-612 provides: 
(1) An "installment contract" is one which requires or authorizes 
the delivery of goods in separate lots to be separately accepted, even 
though the contract contains a clause "each delivery is a separate 
contract" or its equivalent. 
(2) The buyer may reject any installment which is non-conforming 
if the non-conformity substantially impairs the value of that installment 
and cannot be cured or if the non-conformity is a defect in the required 
documents; but if the non-conformity does not fall within subsection 
(3) and the seller gives adequate assurance of its cure the buyer must 
accept that installment. 
(3) Whenever non-conformity or default with respect to one or 
more installments substantially impairs the value of the whole contract 
there is a breach of the whole. But the aggrieved party reinstates the 
contract if he accepts a non-conforming installment without seasonably 
notifying of cancellation or if he brings an action with respect only to 
past installments or demands performance as to future installments. 
157. See Schmitt & Frisch, The Perfect Tender Rule-An Acceptable Inter-
pretation, 13 U. ToL. L. REv. 1375 (1982). The perfect tender rule permits a 
buyer to reject any nonconforming goods. However, the buyer's right to reject 
is often limited by the seller's right to "cure" the defect as provided in U.C.C. 
§ 2-508(2). See also Peters, Remedies for Breach of Contracts Relating to the 
Sale of Goods Under the Uniform Commercial Code: A Roadmap for Article 
Two, 73 YALE L.J. 199 (1963). 
158. See, e.g., Miniter, Buyer's Right of Rejection: A Quarter Century 
Under the Uniform Commercial Code, and Recent International Developments, 
13 GA. L. REv. 805 (1979) (complex U.C.C. provisions concerning rejection and 
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courts. 159 This fascination revolves around the ostensibly inflexible 
language of section 2-601 and the creative interpretations to which 
it has been subjected. The section seems to leave all the options 
with the buyer; the right to reject arises "if the goods or the 
tender of delivery fail in any respect to conform to the contract."160 
This statutory direction appears to permit little, if any, deviation 
from absolutely perfect tender. Counsel would be reluctant to 
advise a seller to assume too casual an attitude toward performance 
responsibilities. 
The language of the cases, however, betrays a certain vacillation 
between the absolute direction of section 2-601 and the demands 
of justice in the individual case. 161 A review of these cases discloses 
cure have resulted in sliding-scale "substantial breach" test); Phillips, Revocation 
of Acceptance and the Consumer Buyer, 15 CoM. L.J. 354 (1970) (revoking buyer 
must prove that goods are "substantially" defective whereas rejecting buyer need 
only show that goods are nonconforming in any respect); Note, Uniform Com-
mercial Code-Sections 2-508 and 2-608-Limitations on the Perfect-Tender Rule, 
69 MicH. L. REv. 130 (1970) (seller's right to correct defect in original tender 
under § 2-508 and "substantial impairment" rule of § 2-608 limit the perfect 
tender concept); Note, Uniform Commercial Code-Seller's Right to Cure a 
Nonconforming Tender, 15 WAYNE L. REv. 938 (1969) ("major-minor" defect 
test does not incorporate seller's reasonable belief or acceptability, however, such 
belief should be determinative of seller's right to cure nonconforming tender after 
time of performance). 
159. See McKenzie v. AlaOhio Coals, Inc., 29 U.C.C. REP. SERV. (Cal-
laghan) 852 D.D.C. 1979) (coal with ash content of 13.50Jo to 160fo nonconforming 
when purchase order specified ash content not to exceed 7.5%); National Fleet 
Supply, Inc. v. Fairchild, 450 N.E.2d 1015 (Ind. Ct. App. 1983) (buyer has 
power to reject goods or tender that fail, in any respect, to conform to contract; 
rejection is generally not available for goods or delivery that fail, in some small 
respect, to conform to sales contract terms); Deaton, Inc. v. Aeroglide Corp., 
99 N.M. 253, 657 P.2d 1093 (1982) (delivery of dump trucks appearing previously 
used constituted delivery of nonconforming goods to distributor). 
160. U.C.C. § 2-601 (emphasis added). Section 2-106(2) defines "conform-
ing" goods as those that "are in accordance with the obligations under the 
contract." . 
For court interpretations of conforming goods, see Irrigation Motor & Pump 
Co. v. Belcher, 29 Colo. App. 343, 483 P.2d 980 (1971) (nonconformity not a 
question of quantity and quality of goods alone, but of performance of the 
seller's entire contractual undertaking); Stockard v. Vernon Co., 9 U.C.C. REP. 
SERV. (Callaghan) 1067 (Okla. Ct. App. 1971) (receipt of calendars six days late, 
making timely delivery by plaintiff difficult, deemed nonconformity). 
161. U.C.C. § 2-601 can be given a strict or relaxed reading. Therefore, 
courts have had difficulty deciding whether it is a "perfect tender" or "substantial 
performance" provision and have often conveyed the impression that the eval-
uation of the transactor's "bona fides" is a determinative factor. Movements in 
the market price between the time of contracting and buyer's attempted rejection 
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that, notwithstanding the absolute language of the provision, there 
are enough loose joints in the Code to accommodate what Professor 
McDonnell would refer to as "purposive interpretation" of the 
perfect tender rule.162 Several commercial courts have focused their 
analysis on facts and equity to avoid a harsh result. 163 In so doing, 
they have often reached the most commercially reasonable164 result, 
either by finding that the parties have "otherwise agreed" to less 
than perfect tender, 165 or by invoking the section 2-508 cure pro-
vision.166 The limits of the right to cure have been described by 
can also be decisive in whether the perfect tender rule is strictly or liberally 
interpreted. See Envirex, Inc. v. Ecological Recovery Assoc. Inc., 454 F. Supp. 
1329 (M.D. Pa. 1978) ("substantial performance" rule incorporated into § 2-601 
permits buyer to reject goods even for technical breach so as to require perfection 
in buyer performance), aff'd, 601 F.2d 574 (3d Cir. 1979); Jones v. Abriani, 
169 Ind. App. 556, 350 N.E.2d 635 (1976) (mobile home nonconforming good 
if fails to meet contract requirements and buyer does not forfeit down payment 
pursuant to liquidated damages clause in sales contract unless perfect tender 
made); Rose v. Epley Motor Sales, 288 N.C. 53, 215 S.E.2d 573 (1975) (used 
car destroyed by engine fire three hours after purchase deemed nonconforming). 
162. See McDonnell, supra note 145. 
163. See, e.g., Marine Mart, Inc. v. L.D. Pearce, 252 Ark.r 601, 608-09, 
480 S.W.2d 133, 137 (1972), in which delivery of boat supposedly "identical" 
to showroom model was a nonconforming good because of damage that occurred 
during delivery. Seller's attempts to cure failed and consequently, the chancellor 
determined the sales contract should be rescinded. In affirming the decision, the 
Arkansas Supreme Court stated that "[w)hat constitutes a nonconforming delivery, 
acceptance, rejection or revocation of acceptance are questions of facts." /d. 
See also Clark v. Zaid, Inc., 263 Md. 127, 282 A.2d 483 (1971), in which the 
court considered thr original quality, the nature and the extent of damage, and 
whether the damage could be repaired to restore the original quality and ap-
pearance in determining whether the purchaser of dining room furniture rightfully 
rejected the goods as nonconforming after their delivery in damaged condition. 
164. See Whaley, supra note 153, at 54; see also Danzig, supra note 85, 
at 632 ("Llewellyn's UCC Article II more often operated as a means of dictating 
a method. That method was designed to prompt decision not according to the 
letter or the logic of a statute or a juristic concept but rather according tor the 
'situation-reason.'"). 
165. The Pennsylvania Court of Common Pleas stated: 
[I]t was the understanding of the parties, confirmed by the course of 
dealings between them, that the time and quantities of the deliveries 
and the variance in the sizes of the sheets of materials were not of the 
essence of the contract. These matters were varied from time to time 
as circumstances might dictate, and were not observed strictly by either 
plaintiff or defend(!nt nor insisted upon by either. 
Bomyte Co. v. L-Co Cabinet Corp., 40 North. Leg. J. 172, 182 (Pa. Ct. Com. 
Pl. 1968), afj'd, 217 Pa. Super. 811, 270 A.2d 253 (1970). 
166. "Subsection [2-508] (2) seeks to avoid injustice to the seller by reason 
of a surprise rejection by the buyer." U.C.C. § 2-508 comment 2. 
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reference to the seriousness of the defect167 and the expectations 
of the rejecting buyer, 168 necessarily fact-determinative analyses. 169 
Although the courts have applied the section 2-508 cure pro-
vision to less than "perfect tender" situations, the section 2-601 
perfect tender provision makes no reference to the seller's right 
to cure. However, in section 2-612, which governs breach of 
installment contracts, there is an express reference to the seller's 
right to cure found in subsection (2). 17° Comment 4 to UCC section 
2-612 articulates the Code's approach to acceptance, in the context 
of installment sales: "A clause requiring accurate compliance as 
a condition to the right to acceptance must . . . avoid imposing 
hardship by surprise and is subject to waiver or to displacement 
by practical construction. " 171 It is not at all clear why this pre-
disposition would apply only to installment contracts. Professor 
Whaley has recognized the essential similarity of the section 2-601 
single delivery, and the section 2-612 installment sales contracts, 
167. See Zabriskie Chevrolet, Inc. v. Smith, 99 N.J. Super. 441, 458, 240 
A.2d 195, 205 {1968), in which an auto dealer attempted to cure tender of a 
new auto that was rendered completely inoperable by mechanical failure near the 
showroom. The court rejected the dealer's attempted cure because "for a majority 
of people the purchase of a new car is a major investment, rationalized by peace 
of mind that flows from dependability and _safety [and] [o]nce their faith is 
shaken, the vehicle loses not only its real value in their eyes, but becomes an 
instrument whose integrity is substantially impaired." Id. See also Bartus v. 
Riccardi, 55 Misc. 2d 3, 284 N.Y.S.2d 222 (1967) (plaintiff hearing aid manu-
facturer entitled to cure after its representative provided defendant with an 
improved version of the hearing aid ordered). 
168. See General Motors Corp. v. Halco Instruments, Inc., 124 Ga. App. 
630, 185 S.E.2d 619 (1971) (several month old auto that needed installation of 
new springs, rear arm control, and new rubber bumpers did not entitle buyer to 
recovery of full purchase price); Rozmus v. Thompson's Lincoln Mercury Co., 
209 Pa. Super. 120, 224 A.2d 782 (1966) (loud noises from engine of new auto 
easily corrected by tightening mounting bolts of drive shaft did not constitute 
"substantial impairment"); Reece v. Yeager Ford Sales, Inc., 155 W. Va. 461, 
184 S.E.2d 722 (1971) (minor defects in new car not affecting operation and 
costing only $80 to repair not substantial impairment in value to make car noncon-
forming, and possession of car for 3400 miles exceeded reasonable time for rescission). 
169. See Whaley, supra note 153, at 57. Section 2-508 cure applies, by its 
own terms, only to situations in which (1) the time for the seller's performance 
has not expired, or (2) the seller has reasonable grounds to believe his noncon-
forming tender will be acceptable. While the first criterion might accommodate 
certain, even formalistic, determination, the second one requiring an objective evalua-
tion of the seller's belief, provides a way for courts to balance equities. See U.C.C. 
§ 2.508. 
170. See supra note 156 for the text of U.C.C. § 2-612. 
171. U.C.C. § 2-612 comment 4. 
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concluding that any distinction between the two ''is largely a 
fiction. " 172 Comment 3 to section 2-612 advises that "the sense 
of the situation [should] prevail over any uncommercial and le-
galistic interpretation." 173 In sum, there is little to restrain a court 
that seeks to do justice when confronted with what would otherwise 
be an uncomfortable tender and acceptance problem according to 
formalistic "perfect tender" principles. 
As demonstrated in the acceptance sections, Llewellyn enhanced 
the effectiveness of Article 2 "rules" by setting the "words and 
paper in perspective. " 174 Legal realism, with its emphasis on context 
rather than dogma, was by no means an abdication of rules. At 
most, Llewellyn's jurisprudence counsels a healthy "rule-skepti-
cism."175 There is a tension, however, that clearly invites vigorous, 
if perhaps naive, criticism: "flexible" rules may be tantamount to 
no rules, and a commercial law system preoccupied with flexibility 
sacrifices certainty and predictability .176 Yet a realist's response to 
criticisms of flexible rules would be that formalism, the alternative 
to flexibility, frustrates and does not serve the interests of com-
mercial transactors. A court confronted with a formalistic enact-
ment will often reach what it deems to be the right result, 
notwithstanding the pressures imposed by the letter of the statute. 
Llewellyn's Sales Article proceeds from a different jurisprudential 
perspective than that which guided the drafting of Article 4. The 
reasonableness of the transactors' conduct, a tort concept, has 
direct application in Article 2. However, its application is inapposite 
in the law of commercial paper, at least from the perspective of 
financial institutions.177 Article 2 vindicates the conclusion that tort 
principles provide the means to utilize flexibility as a constructive, 
rather than disruptive, force in the commercial law .178 Such flex-
ibility provides a system of analysis in which facts are determinative, 
rules are opportunities rather than obstacles, and commercial rea-
172. Whaley, supra note 153, at 53. 
173. U.C.C. § 2-612 comment 3. 
174. Llewellyn, supra note 7, at 453. 
175. See Verdun-Jones, The Jurisprudence of Karl Llewellyn, 1 DALHOUSIE 
L.J. 441 (1974). I 
176. See Report of New York Law Revision Committee 28 (1956) (criticizing 
a provision of a draft that relied heavily on principles of commercial reasona-
bleness); cj. Leff, supra note 85, at 558 (concluding, with regard to § 2-302, 
that "it has, really, no reality referent, and all of its explanatory material ranges 
between the irrelevant and the misleading"). 
177. See supra text accompanying notes 149-152. 
178. See supra text accompanying notes 85-118. 
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sonableness facilitates situation sense and dignity of substance and 
result. 179 
V. THE INTEGRATION OF PAYMENTS LEGISLATION: 
OBSTACLES AND OPPORTUNITIES 
Any pervasive, preemptive effort to codify payments law will 
fail without the acquiescence, if not active support, of the affected 
interest groups. 180 Such support must not be obtained at the price 
of unjust, and therefore, ill-reasoned resolution of trouble cases. 181 
Expediency should be only a secondary goal. Accommodation of 
opposing positions requires representatives of financial institutions 
and consumer groups to abandon intransigent postures to advance 
the commercial codification movement. They will all, certainly, 
deny motivations that would hamper realization of the right and 
just result. That is lobbying. 
The Reporter of the U.N.P.C. project suggested that market 
forces have already supplied the impetus for consensus. 182 That 
179. See supra text accompanying note 143. 
180. It was primarily the financial institutions' uneasiness with the perceived 
consumer orientation of the U.N.P.C. that lead to the project's demise. See 
Alces, supra note 3, at 89 n.21; see also Leary & Fry, A «systemsn Approach 
to Payment Modes: Moving Toward a New Payments Code, 16 U.C.C. L.J. 
283, 286 n.8 (1984) (The 3-4-8 Committee asked its Reporter, Professor Scott, 
to rework P.E.B. Draft No.3 of the U.N.P.C. and to "leave consumer protection 
measures to federal enactments."). 
181. The case of trouble, again, is the case of doubt, or is that in 
which discipline has failed, or is that in which unruly personality is 
breaking through into new paths of action or of leadership, or is that 
in which an ancient institution isr being tried against emergent forces. 
It is the case of trouble which makes, breaks, twists, or flatly establishes 
a rule, an institution, an authority. Not all such cases do so. There are 
also petty rows, the routine of law-stuff which exists among primitives 
as well as among moderns. For all that, if there be a portion of a 
society's life in which tensions of the culture come to expression, in 
which the play of variant urges can be felt and seen, in which emergent 
power-patterns, ancient security-drives, religion, politics, personality, and 
cross-purposed views of justice tangle in the open, that portion of the 
life will concentrate in the case of trouble or disturbance. Not only the 
making of new law and the effect of old, but the hold and the thrust 
of all other vital aspects of the culture, shine clear in the crucible of 
conflict. 
K. LLEWELLYN & E. HOEBEL, THE CHEYENNE WAY 29 (1941). 
182. See Scott, supra note 18, at 792; Memorandum from Professor Hal 
Scott to National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws 43 (June 
15, 1983) (introduction to U.N.P.C., P.E.B. Draft No. 3). 
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argument has been refuted from the clear perspective of hindsight. 183 
Given the demise of the U.N.P.C. effort, it is easy to despair of 
considering the codification of payments law from the perspective 
of Karl Llewellyn's legal realism. Those who represent the interests 
of financial institutions offer the bald assertion that what is good 
for banks is ultimately good for bank customers. The represen-
tatives of the interests of financial institutions argue, essentially, 
that we ought not complain of legislation that streamlines the flow 
of payments and makes business easier for banks. Impediments 
to the smooth transfer of funds would merely frustrate rather than 
serve the interests of consumers. 184 Such unwieldy impediments 
might be accommodated, but at a cost that would ultimately be 
borne by bank customers.185 This line of argument is provocative 
but not entirely correct. 
Imposing the costs of the stop payment "right," or any other 
consumer protection measure, on financial institutions operates 
much as would a tax. At first blush, the cost of a protection, a 
tax-like cost, would appear, ultimately, to be passed to the con-
sumer by financial institutions acting as mere conduits to transfer 
the financial burden to consumers. This assertion, however, is not 
entirely accurate: "[N]ot all taxes are borne by the supplier [bank], 
nor are all taxes passed on to consumers [bank customers], as is 
often asserted. Who bears the increased cost in what proportion 
depends on the supply and demand relationships." 186 
183. See Alces, supra note 3, at 101-03 (describing ther financial institutions 
lobby's case against the U.N.P.C. and suggesting reasons for market forces 
failure to accommodate the development of preemptive payments legislation). 
184. See New York Clearing House, Statement on the Proposed Uniform 
New Payments Code 13, 14 (Sept. 29, 1983) (elimination of Price v. Neal rule 
would impair utility of checks because merchants would remain liable for length 
of applicable statute of limitations) (on file at The Wayne Law Review). 
185. For the argument that the expense of providing a right to reverse 
payments would be shifted from financial institutions to consumers of financial 
services, see Alces, supra note 3, at 110-11 (citing R. Brandel, Remarks at the 
Uniform New Payments Code 1983 Invitational Conference (Sept. 30, 1983)). 
186. A. Al.CHIAN & W. ALLEN, EXCHANGE & PRODUCTION: COMPETITION, 
COORDINATION, & CONTROL 66 (3d ed. 1983). If a bank attempts to impose the 
full cost increase created by a new legal obligation on its customers, fewer 
financial services would be "consumed." Any price increase decreases demand 
and moves consumers up their demand schedule. The bank does not realize the 
benefit of a higher price, only the detriment of a reduced demand. The amount 
of the increased cost passed on to consumers, then, will depend on the slopes 
or "elasticity" of the demand and supply curves. The more elastic the supply 
curve, the more the cost that will be passed on. The market establishes the new 
equilibrium; the discretion of financial institutions cannot. 
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The consequences of this micro-economic reality are significant 
for the drafters of payments law concerned about the relative legal 
positions of banks and bank customers. It is inappropriate to 
assume that consumers ultimately pay the full cost of all consumer 
protection measures. If that were so, financial institutions would 
have no reason to resist such measures. Consumer lawyers em-
phasize the disparity of bargaining power and conclude; 
The law of [payment systems187] should not be dictated 
by bank technology, nor should the law conflict with banks' 
reasonable use of electronic equipment. Rather, the law 
should embody the fundamental principles to which com-
mercial law188 has always tried to be faithful, and bank 
technology should have to find its place in the context of 
those principles. Those principles allow customers to take 
advantage of their rights as long as they conduct themselves 
in a reasonable fashion. 189 Similarly, b'imks must behave in 
accordance with reasonable commercial standards, using 
ordinary care. 190•191 
The ''humanizers' approach to technology'' 192 reflected in this 
excerpt is intriguing but provides little guidance. The further 
"specificity" that the author offers is designed "to prevent judges 
[and presumably jurors] from interpreting reasonableness in what-
ever manner conforms to their individual values." 193 Although the 
187. In the original text, the author writes specifically about stop payment 
law. His observations, however, may be applied fairly to the law of payment 
systems generally. Prior to joining the Emory Law School faculty, Professor 
Budnitz was the Litigation Coordinator of the National Consumer Law Center 
in Boston, Massachusetts. 
188. For discussion of essential or fundamental principles in the commercial 
law, see Alces, supra note 3, at 91 (citing Gilmore, The Uniform Commercial 
Code: A Reply to Professor Beutel, 61 YALE L.J. 364, 365 (1952); Llewellyn, 
Problems of Codifying Security Law, 13 LAw & CoNTEMP. PRoBS. 687, 696 
(1948)). But cj. Scott, supra note 18, at 737 (asserting there is no jurisprudence 
of commercial law) (footnote added). 
189. U.C.C. §§ 3-406, 4-406(1) (1977) (portion of original footnote omitted). 
For the full text of the original footnote, see Budnitz, supra note 64, at 283 
n.199. 
190. See, e.g. , U.C.C. §§ 3-406, 4-103(1), 4-406(1), (3) (portion of original 
footnote omitted). For the full text of the original footnote, see Budnitz, supra 
note 64, at 283 n.200. 
191. Budnitz, supra note 64, at 283. 
192. !d. at 284. 
193. Id. at 283. 
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laudable terms of the commentator's more specific recommenda-
tions accommodate situation sense adjudication, 194 the formulation 
is cosmetic rather than fundamental legal realism. It does little 
more than substantiate the criticism of the UCC's common law 
approach. 195 To understand legal realism in commercial code jur-
isprudence is to recognize that specification cannot inhibit judges' 
and juries' reference to their individual values. 
If market or other social forces ultimately lead to a new 
comprehensive payments law effort, the frustrations and incon-
sistencies of the past commercial codification projects should pro-
vide a valuable lesson. Article 2 demonstrates what can work; 
Article 4, the E.F.T.A., and the U.N.P.C. confirm that the lack 
of a coherent jurisprudential perspective will undermine even the 
most ambitious formalistic efforts. Rather than admonishing triers 
of fact and law to do the reasonable thing, a hollow direction, 
legal realism establishes a regime, a regularized practice that would, 
through instrumentalist techniques, reveal the crucial situation 
sense. This is a difficult, but indispensable idea: 
[S]ince the ultimate effectuation of a purpose is in terms 
of action, of behavior, the verbal formulation, to be an 
efficient tool, must be such as will produce the behavior 
desired . 
. . . [O]ne of the statutory draftsman's major problems 
is ... to make sure that his formula, when it becomes an 
official rule, will not merely bask in the sun upon the 
books. He must so shape it as to induce its application 
196 
194. See supra supra note 92 and the sources cited for a discussion of 
situation sense. 
195. See, e.g., Danzig, supra note 85, at 627 ("The troublesome vacuity 
of the unconscionability provision [U.C.C. § 2-302] underscores not only the 
passivity of the Legislature in the UCC-Llewellyn scheme, but also the singular 
difficulties that that jurisprudential approach has in dealing with issues involving 
moral judgments."); Leff, supra note 85, at 488 ("One central thesis of this 
essay is that the draftsmen failed fully to appreciate the significance of the 
unconscionability concept's necessary procedure-substance dichotomy and that 
such failure is one of the primary reasons for section 2-302's final amorphous 
unintelligibility and its accompanying commentary's final irrelevance."). Leff's 
article has been described as the "silliest of them all, considering the uncons-
cionability issue. Dawson, Unconscionable Coercion: The German Version, 89 
HARv. L. REV. 1041, 1041 n.1 (1976). 
196. Llewellyn, supra note 7, at 452 (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted). 
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The draftsman must induce compliance such that affected parties 
order their affairs to realize the benefits conferred by the for-
mulation. The only responsible way to determine the most proper 
formulation is to observe the behavior of the interested transactors 
and draft the law to urge them in the direction of that reasonable 
behavior that would assure "certainty of substance" and "dignity 
of result." 197 However, measuring all behavior by reference to an 
undifferentiated and vague reasonableness standard is insufficient. 
Although ultimately triers of fact and law will interpret the dimensions 
of a particular controversy by their own sense of justice, the way 
in which the governing legislation is drafted may structure their 
deliberations. 
Article 2, as demonstrated above, 198 incorporates the reason-
ableness analysis derived from tort law. It does not, however, 
dictate that analytical method without elaboration.199 Llewellyn's 
legal realism consistently provides a means to supplant the for-
malistic strictures of traditional contract law with the fact-deter-
minative, situation-specific approach of tort analysis. For example, 
section 2-201, the Code's primary200 statute of frauds provision, 
describes a procedure that merchants201 may utilize to avoid the 
unjust results provided by the common law .202 No longer may a 
merchant acknowledge with impunity his receipt of a written 
197. See Llewellyn, supra note 143, at 610; supra text accompanying notes 
143-46. 
198. See supra text accompanying notes 153-73. 
199. See U.C.C. § 2-508; supra text accompanying notes 163-66. The cure 
provision works with the acceptance provisions of § 2-601 and § 2-612 by 
describing the circumstances that lead to the conclusion that the seller should be 
given what amounts to a second chance: either the time for performance has 
not yet expired or the seller "had reasonable grounds to believe the non-conforming 
tender would be acceptable." If one of the criteria are satisfied, imagining why 
the harsh results of a formalistic "perfect tender" rule should be permitted to 
frustrate the justified expectations of commercial transactors is difficult. Moreover, 
the tender, acceptance, and cure provisions do not sacrifice the certainty of 
commercial transactions or impair the expectations of the affected transactors. 
200. Other Code provisions imposing a writing requirement are §§ 3-104 
(Commercial Paper), 5-104 (Letters of Credit), and 9-203 (Secured Transactions). 
201. See V.C.C. § 2-104(1). 
202. See id. § 2-201(2). The full text of this subsection is reproduced supra 
note 121. The subsection provides that a confirmatory writing sufficient to charge 
the sending merchant will bind the addressee merchant if the recipient "has 
reason to know its contents" and fails to return written objection to its contents 
within 10 days. By providing that regime, the drafters permitted the parties to 
a sales transaction to posture themselves in such a way that the equities would 
clearly appear. 
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confirmation and avoid enforcement of the contract because his 
"signature"203 is not on the piece of paper. Article 2 thus establishes 
criteria that are consistent with general conceptions of fair dealing, 
urging transactors and courts in the commercially reasonable di-
rection.204 
Similarly, section 2-209 is drafted to avoid the harsh appli-
cation of the contract law preexisting duty rule. Although the 
drafters limited the availability of contract modification mecha-
nisms, they devised the waiver concept to invite courts to reach 
the right result.205 Section 2-209 allows the equities to be adjusted 
by the conduct of one or both the parties. Triers of fact and law 
are thus left free to reach the decision to which they feel compelled, 
without violating the statutory language. In addition, predictability 
and certainty are not sacrificed because the provision mandates 
compliance with particular requirements to support a particular 
result. This would not be true had the drafters of section 2-209 
merely directed courts to find for the litigant whose behavior 
appeared most reasonable, based on actions of similarly situated 
transactors. The provision avoids formalistic analysis by catalogu-
ing indicia or badges of commercial reasonableness consistent with 
our understanding of justice, instead of dispositively describing 
what is and what is not reasonable. Article 2 works because it 
guides rather than prescribes. The commercial paper provisions do 
not share the same insight. 
The inefficacy of the Article 4 treatment of the stop payment 
"right" starkly contrasts the efficacy of legal realism in sales law. 206 
The section 4-407 subrogation provision is a certain, albeit elab-
orate, device for financial institutions to impose a myopic view 
of justice and commercial reasonableness on bank customers.207 
203. "'Signed' includes any symbol executed or adopted by a party with 
a present intention to authenticate a writing." U.C.C. § 1-201(30). 
204. See also id.§ 2-103(1)(b) ("In this Article unless the context otherwise 
requires ... '[g]ood faith' in the case of a merchant means honesty in fact and 
the observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing in the trade.''). 
205. !d. § 2-209(5) provides: 
A party who has made a waiver affecting an executory portion of 
the contract may retract the waiver by reasonable notification received 
by the other party that strict performance will be required of any term 
waived, unless the retraction would be unjust in view of a material 
change of position in reliance on the waiver. 
206. See supra text accompanying notes 19-33. 
207. If a bank can identify a prior holder in due course, it may avoid its 
obligation to its customer after it has negligently paid an item over a stop 
payment order. U.C.C. § 4-407(a); see supra text accompanying notes 19-29. 
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There is no room for "situation sense," no opportunity for triers 
of fact or law to reach the right result. Holder in due course 
status, a legal conclusion that has outlived its reason, 203 becomes 
the means to arrive at an answer. A customer who has complied 
scrupulously with the requirements of section 4-403,209 and may 
very well be blameless in all aspects of the transaction concerned, 
will necessarily lose to a negligent bank able to identify a prior 
holder in due course. That has not always been the case210 and is 
perhaps the best evidence that Article 4 owes little to Llewellyn's 
legal realism. Although defenders of the commercial paper provisions 
will argue the unique need for certainty, speed, and efficiency 
dictated by the role of negotiable instruments in our economy, 211 
that position has been refuted by commentators. 212 The demands 
for certainty apparently are not as great when financial institutions 
would be subject to the inflexible aspects of formalistic analysis. 213 
208. See supra text accompanying notes 35-38 and sources cited in note 
37. 
209. See supra note 19. 
210. See supra text accompanying notes 33-62 for a drafting history of the 
stop payment "right" in Article 4. 
211. It is axiomatic that negotiable instruments should be "couriers without 
luggage." U.C.C. § 3-104 comment 3 (Proposed Final Draft, Spring 1950), 
reprinted in 10 U.C.C.: DRAris, supra note 31, at 319. The negotiability regime 
and the holder in due course doctrine are designed to assure that instruments 
will flow in commerce as expeditiously as cash, but with fewer security problems. 
In a case that contributed significantly to the development of negotiable instru-
ments law, Lord Mansfield emphasized the cash-substitute nature of commercial 
paper. Miller v. Race, 97 Eng. Rep. 398, 401 (K.B. 1758). 
In commenting upon the efficacy of reversibility of payment provisions in 
the U.N.P.C., Roland Brandel recently suggested that it would be more appro-
priate to burden the small claims courts with disputes concerning payment for 
goods than it would be to burden the payment system, which puts a high premium 
on certainty, finality, and celerity. R. Brandel, Remarks at the Uniform New 
Payments Code 1983 Invitational Conference (Sept. 30, 1983) (on file at The 
Wayne Law Review). For a thorough description of the high-speed procedures 
that banks utilize to clear checks, see M. MAYER, THE BANKERS 119-54 (1974). 
212. See, e.g., Rosenthal, supra note 36, at 401 ("In a number of situations 
today, negotiability, and specifically the protection of holders in due course, 
are not necessary or even helpful in fostering the flow of commerce."); U.N.P.C. 
§ 103 comment 2, at 104-05 ("Times have changed since Peacock v. Rhodes, 99 
Eng. Rep. 402, was decided by the King's Bench in 1781. Those parties to whom 
checks are negotiated rely principally on the credit of the persons from whom 
they take the checks, rather than on the credit of drawers."). U.N.P.C. § 103 
would have effectively destroyed the negotiability and holder in due course 
concepts in the context of consumer checks. 
213. Although U.C.C. § 4-103(1) provides that "[t]he effect of the provisions 
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Recall that the bank lobby resisted the application of an objective 
standard in the original good faith element of holder in due course 
status for fear that it "might be read to freeze commercial 
practices. " 214 Also, the final payment provision of Article 4,215 
arguably, leaves banks quite free to determine the exact point at 
which their liability on an item matures.216 
Although other instances of the double standard assured by 
Article 4 may be uncovered, perhaps the most revealing example 
is the bifurcated approach to "giving value" for purposes of 
acquiring holder in due course status. Section 3-303 limits the ways 
in which a holder may be deemed to have given value to exclude 
executory promises as well as certain commitments not directly 
referable to the acquisition of the item. 217 Comment 6 explains 
of this Article may be varied by agreement," there is little question that the only 
"agreement" that might alter the provisions of the Bank Deposits and Collections 
law would be the account agreement executed by a customer· at the time an 
account is opened. There is no haggling over the terms of such agreement. 
Professor Gilmore lamented with regard to the provision, "The only bright [spot 
is} ... that a court, construing Section 4-103 according to its fair meaning, 
might be disposed to hold the Article unconstitutional as an improper delegation 
of legislative power to private interests .... " Gilmore, supra note 4, at 375-
76. 
214. See Braucher, supra note 151, at 812 (citing 1951 A.B.A. SECTION 
REPORT 126-28, 181). 
215. See U.C.C. § 4-213(1)(c), which provides that "[a]n item is finally 
paid by a payor bank when the bank has done any of the following, whichever 
happens first: . . . completed the process of posting the item to the indicated 
account of the drawer, maker or other person to be charged therewith!' !d. § 
4-209(e) defines "process of posting" as including "correcting or reversing an 
entry or erroneous action with respect to the item." 
216. See West Side Bank v. Marine Nat'l Exch. Bank, 37 Wis. 2d 661, 
155 N.W.2d 587 (1968), in which the court held that the process of posting was 
not completed until the midnight deadline. The result of the decision was to 
permit a drawee/payor to reverse a payment decision up to its midnight deadline 
for any reason whatsoever. In fact, in West Side Bank, the court found that the 
rules of the Milwaukee Clearing House Association could extend the midnight 
deadline because U.C.C. §§ 4-103(1), (2) sanctioned the adjustment of that 
deadline. 37 Wis. 2d at 672, 155 N.W .2d at 593. 
The West Side Bank opinion has not been consistently followed by the 
courts. For courts rejecting the West Side Bank analysis, see H. Schultz & Sons, 
Inc. v. Bank of Suffolk County, 439 F. Supp. 1137 (E.D.N.Y. 1977); Community 
Bank v. United States Nat'l Bank of Oregon, 276 Or. 471, 555 P.2d 435 {1976). 
Commentators have also questioned West Side Bank. See, e.g., J. WHITE & R. 
SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, 623-24 (2d ed. 1980); W. HAWKLAND & 
L. LAWRENCE, supra note 152, at § 4-213:04 (Art. 4) (1984); Malcolm, Reflections 
on West Side Bank: A Draftsman's View, 18 CATH. U.L. REv. 23 (1968). 
217. U.C.C. § 3-303 provides: 
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that the type of "irrevocable commitment" contemplated by section 
3-303(c) as sufficient "value" would be an "irrevocable commit-
ment to a third person, such as a letter of credit issued when an 
instrument is taken.' '218 Less irrevocable commitments would be 
mere executory promises, sufficient as consideration but insufficient 
as value. 219 
Contrast with sec~ion 3-303 "value/' the Article 4 "se_curity 
interest" concept. Section 4-209 alters the section 3-303 value 
determination by providing: 
For purposes of determining its status as a holder in -
due course, the bank has given value to the extent that it 
has a security interest in an item provided that the bank 
otherwise complies with the requirements of Section 3-302 
[ 220] on what constitutes a holder in due course.221 
The comment to section 4-209 explains that "[t]he provision is in 
accord with ... Article 3 (Section 3-303). " 222 Perhaps from the 
A holder takes the instrument for value 
(a) to the extent that the agreed consideration has been performed 
or that he acquires a security interest in or a lien on the instrument 
otherwise than by legal process; 
(b) when he takes the instrument in payment of or as security for 
an antecedent claim against any person whether or not the claim is due; 
(c) when he gives a negotiable instrument for it or makes an 
irrevocable commitment to a third person. 
218. Id. § 3-303 comment 6. 
219. See Bennett v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 19 N.C. App. 
66, 198 S.E.2d 33, cert. denied, 284 N.C. 121, 199 S.E.2d 659 (1973) (§ 3-303(c) 
contemplates simultaneous exchange· and does not include commitments made by 
holder after acquiring instrument). "The commitment has to be of such a character 
that it cannot be rescinded when the holder learns of a claim or defense on the 
instrument in return for which the holder gave the commitment." W. HAWKLAND 
& L. LAWRENCE, supra note 152, at§ 3-303:07 (Art. 3) (1984). Courts have been 
disposed to find a holder's placing documents, instruments, or money in escrow 
to be a sufficiently irrevocable commitment to constitute giving value. See Crest 
Finance Co. v. First Bank of Westmont, 37 Ill. 2d 243, 226 N.E.2d 369 (1967); 
Schranz v. I.L. Grossman, Inc., 90 Ill. App. 3d 507, 412 N.E.2d 1378 (1980). 
220. U.C.C. § 3-302(1) provides: 
A holder in due course is a holder who takes the instrument 
(a) for value; and 
(b) in good faith; and 
(c) without notice that it is overdue or has been dishonored or 
of any defense against or claim to it on the part of any person. 
221. Id. U.C.C. § 4-209. 
222. Id. § 4-209 comment. 
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perspective of the Article 4 drafter, sections 3-303 and 4-209 are 
coextensive. Consideration of section 4-208,223 however, supports 
a less symmetrical conclusion. Professor Rosenthal, in his Article 
describing the incongruities of the negotiability concept, illustrated 
how the "first-in-first-out" rule of section 4-208(2)224 protects banks 
in a manner not available to nonbank holders. 225 A bank, then, 
223. !d. § 4-208. The tile of this section is "Security Interest of Collecting 
Bank in Items, Accompanying Documents and Proceeds." 
224. ld. § 4-208(2) provides: 
When credit which has been given for several items received at one 
time or pursuant to a single agreement is withdrawn or applied in part 
the security interest remains upon all the items, any accompanying 
documents or the proceeds of either. For the purpose of this section, 
credits first given are first withdrawn. 
225. Rosenthal, supra note 37, at 382-88. Professor Rosenthal's illustration 
is as follows: 
Suppose that an appliance dealer has $100 in his account on February 
1st. On February 2nd, he sells a defective refrigerator for $500, and is 
paid by the buyer with a check in that amount, which he deposits the 
same day. On February 3rd, the dealer makes a number of cash sales 
and deposits $5,000 in cash in his account. On February 4th, he writes 
checks totaling $2,000 to pay his creditors, and they, having been worried 
about his credit, promptly cash the checks at the dealer's bank. Mean-
while, the buyer has stopped payment on his $500 check, but the 
depositary bank finds out about this only on February 5th. 
If the provisional credit of the buyer's check is included until 
revoked, the dealer's account as of the close of business on each day 
was as follows: 
February 1 $ 100 
February 2 600 
February 3 5,600 
February 4 3,600 
February 5 3,100 
Even if the provisional credit for the buyer's check is not taken 
into consideration, the dealer's account as of the close of business on 
each day would have been as follows: 
February 1 $ 100 
February 2 100 
February 3 5,100 
February 4 3,100 
February 5 3,100 
At no point will the bank have taken the buyer's check into account 
in permitting withdrawals; in fact, the bank was legally required to 
honor the $2;000 in checks drawn on February 4th and would have 
been liable for any proximately resulting damages if it had dishonored 
them. 
Despite all of these facts, the bank may well qualify as a holder 
in due course of the buyer's $500 check. The reason for this is the rule 
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without actual reliance on a check, may become a holder in due 
course of the instrument while a nonbank transferee would not 
because section 3-303 expressly excludes executory promises from 
its definition of value. 226 This apparent inequity was not present 
in the pre-Code law. 227 
To discern the important commercial interest that might be 
vindicated by the 4-208/3-303 dichotomy is difficult. Chancellor 
Hawkland explained the commercial transactors' interest in cer-
tainty in terms of stability.228 No apparent reason exists for con-
cluding that section 4-208 better assures certainty in this area of 
the law than does section 3-303. Seemingly, actual reliance, an 
intermediate position between those assured by section 3-303 (ex-
ecutory promise insufficient) and section 4-208 (credit available for 
withdrawal as of right sufficient), would best serve the interests 
of commerce and justice. Moreover, imposing on banks the burden 
of proving actual reliance would place no greater burden on 
of first-in-first-out: section 4-208(2) of the Code provides that "credits 
first given are first withdrawn" for purposes of the rule under which 
a depositary bank may become a holder in due course. 
/d. at 386-87 (footnotes omitted). 
226. "An executory promise to give value is not itself value .... " U.C.C. 
§ 3-303 comment 3. 
227. "Even where the credit is made without special contract that the credit 
is only provisional, the bank does not become a holder for value until the 
depositor has actually availed himself of the credit so given by drawing on it." 
2 Report of New York Law Revision Committee 910 (1955) (citing National Bank 
ofr Ashtabula v. Bradley, 264 F. 700 (W.D.N.Y. 1920); Bath Nat'l Bank v. 
Sonnenstrahl, Inc., 249 N.Y. 391, 164 N.E. 327 (1928); Riverside Bank v. 
Woodhaven Junction Land Co., 34 A.D. 359, 54 N.Y.S. 266 (1898)). "Paragraph 
(b) of Section 4-208(1) goes beyond both the present provision of N.Y.N.I.L. § 
350-b ... and the common law banker's lien in giving a security interest where 
credit has been made available for withdrawal but has not yet been drawn upon." 
!d. at 1344. Also, early drafts of U.C.C. § 4-208 did not provide that a bank 
had given value by merely having given credit available for withdrawal as of 
right. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 4-208 (Proposed Final Draft, Spring 1950), reprinted 
in 10 U.C.C.: DRAFTs, supra note 31, at 505. U.C.C. § 4-211 of the September 
1950 Revisions of Article 4 is the first instance in which the formulation of 
current section 4-208(1)(b) begins to take form. U.C.C. § 4-211 (Revisions of 
Articles 2, 4 & 9, Sept. 1950), reprinted in 11 U.C.C.: DRAFTs, supra note 31, 
at 370-71. It was not until the 1956 Recommendations of the Editorial Board 
for the U.C.C., however, that § 4-208(1)(b) was finalized. The reason given for 
the revision is "to reflect more accurately the self-:liquidating nature of a collecting 
bank's security interest in the ordinary case where collection is effected." U.C.C. 
§ 4-208 (1956 Recommendations of Editorial Board for the U.C.C.), reprinted 
in 18 U.C.C.: DRAFTs, supra note 31, at 172. 
228. Hawkland, supra note 87, at 293-99, 320. 
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depositary banks than is currently imposed by section 3-307(3). 229 
The continued application of double standards will frustrate efforts 
to achieve the integration of payments law. 
VI. CoNCLUSION 
Drafters must balance costs. They must determine whether the 
benefits to be derived by consumer protection legislation are suf-
ficient to justify the costs that consumers will be forced to assume; 
whether the benefits of negotiability and the expeditious flow of 
payments are overstated. The method of legal realism described 
in this Article affords a proven frame of reference to guide the 
resolution of those tensions. Consumer and financial institution 
practices must be consulted to properly order the statutory checks 
and balances designed to assure dignity of result. If, in reality, 
banks do not rely on the creditworthiness of those who draw 
checks to the order of their customers, the payments law should 
not recognize and give effect to any fiction that assumes they do. 
Likewise, consumers should not benefit at the expense of their 
banks if, in reality, reimbursing the consumer for his bank's failure 
to effect the stop of an electronic funds transfer causes the 
consumer no loss. Subrogation theory is appropriate, but only to 
avoid unjust enrichment and not to unfairly favor financial insti-
tutions. As this Article has endeavored to demonstrate, the reso-
lution of the imbalance between proconsumer and profinancial 
institution legislation often lies between the extremes established 
by the two bodies of law. The electronic fund transfer law has, 
to a considerable extent, been a response to the inequities perpet-
uated by the bank lobby's version of Article 4. By the use of 
jurisprudential and historical analysis, this Article has established 
a foundation for the codification of payments law. Concrete 
proposals have been offered to provide an illustration of the means 
of accommodation with regard to section 4-407 subrogation issues 
and 4-208/4-209 value issues. 
Before a comprehensive and preemptive body of payments law 
will advance the codified commercial law, we must distill the 
coherent compromise of interests from the incongruities produced 
by the lobbying efforts of special interest groups. This Article 
affords an initial, albeit modest, step in that direction. The drafters 
229. U.C.C. § 3-307(3) provides: "After it is shown that a defense exists 
a person claiming the rights of a holder in due course has the burden of 
establishing that he or some person under whom he claims is in all respects a 
holder in due course." 
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of payments law should examine the Sales Article of the UCC to 
facilitate. their efforts. Its vocabulary provides a useful prototype 
and the more Llewellynesque provisions of Article 2 represent, 
perhaps, the best application of jurisprudential principles to con-
crete "trouble cases." 
